I’d have to disagree here; I think that “faith” is a useful reference class that pretty effectively cleaves reality at the joints, which does in fact lump together the epistemologies Penn Jilette is objecting to.
The fact that some communities of people who have norms which promote taking beliefs on faith do not tend to engage in acts of violence, while some such communities do, does not mean that their epistemologies are particularly distinct. Their specific beliefs might be different, but one group will not have much basis to criticize the grounds of others’ beliefs.
The flaw he’s arguing here is not “faith-based reasoning sometimes drives people to commit acts of violence,” but “faith-based reasoning is unreliable enough that it can justify anything, in practice as well as principle, including acts of extreme violence.”
I’d have to disagree here; I think that “faith” is a useful reference class that pretty effectively cleaves reality at the joints, which does in fact lump together the epistemologies Penn Jilette is objecting to.
People who follow the moral code of the Bible versus peopel that don’t is also a pretty clear criteria that separates some epistemologies from others.
The fact that some communities of people who have norms which promote taking beliefs on faith do not tend to engage in acts of violence, while some such communities do, does not mean that their epistemologies are particularly distinct.
People who uses a pendulum to make decisions as a very different epistemology than someone who thinks about what the authorities in his particular church want him to do and acts accordingly.
“faith-based reasoning is unreliable enough that it can justify anything, in practice as well as principle, including acts of extreme violence.”
The kind of people who win the world debating championship also haave no problem justying policies like genocide with rational arguments that win competive intellectual debates.
Justifying actions is something different than decision criteria.
People who follow the moral code of the Bible versus peopel that don’t is also a pretty clear criteria that separates some epistemologies from others.
Yes, but then you can go a step down from there, and ask “why do you believe in the contents of the bible?” For some individuals, this will actually be a question of evidence; they are prepared to reason about the evidence for and against the truth of the biblical narrative, and reject it given an adequate balance of evidence. They’re generally more biased on the question than they realize, but they are at least convinced that they must have adequate evidence to justify their belief in the biblical narrative.
I have argued people out of their religious belief before (and not just Christianity,) but never someone who thought that it was correct to take factual beliefs that feel right “on faith” without first convincing them that this is incorrect as a general rule, not simply in the specific case of religion. This is an epistemic underpinning which unites people from different religions, whatever tenets or holy books they might ascribe to. I’ve also argued the same point with people who were not religious; it’s not simply a quality of any particular religion, it’s one of the most common memetic defenses in the human arsenal.
I’d have to disagree here; I think that “faith” is a useful reference class that pretty effectively cleaves reality at the joints, which does in fact lump together the epistemologies Penn Jilette is objecting to.
The fact that some communities of people who have norms which promote taking beliefs on faith do not tend to engage in acts of violence, while some such communities do, does not mean that their epistemologies are particularly distinct. Their specific beliefs might be different, but one group will not have much basis to criticize the grounds of others’ beliefs.
The flaw he’s arguing here is not “faith-based reasoning sometimes drives people to commit acts of violence,” but “faith-based reasoning is unreliable enough that it can justify anything, in practice as well as principle, including acts of extreme violence.”
People who follow the moral code of the Bible versus peopel that don’t is also a pretty clear criteria that separates some epistemologies from others.
People who uses a pendulum to make decisions as a very different epistemology than someone who thinks about what the authorities in his particular church want him to do and acts accordingly.
The kind of people who win the world debating championship also haave no problem justying policies like genocide with rational arguments that win competive intellectual debates.
Justifying actions is something different than decision criteria.
Yes, but then you can go a step down from there, and ask “why do you believe in the contents of the bible?” For some individuals, this will actually be a question of evidence; they are prepared to reason about the evidence for and against the truth of the biblical narrative, and reject it given an adequate balance of evidence. They’re generally more biased on the question than they realize, but they are at least convinced that they must have adequate evidence to justify their belief in the biblical narrative.
I have argued people out of their religious belief before (and not just Christianity,) but never someone who thought that it was correct to take factual beliefs that feel right “on faith” without first convincing them that this is incorrect as a general rule, not simply in the specific case of religion. This is an epistemic underpinning which unites people from different religions, whatever tenets or holy books they might ascribe to. I’ve also argued the same point with people who were not religious; it’s not simply a quality of any particular religion, it’s one of the most common memetic defenses in the human arsenal.