It’s worse than that: SI doesn’t even try to build a meaningful ontological model.
I’ve heard from some critrats, “there is no such thing as inductive cognition, it’s just evolution”,
Why can’t it be both?
Alongside that, somewhat confusing the issue, there is another definition of induction; induction is whatever cognitive process takes a stream of observation of a phenomena and produces theories that are good for anticipating future observations
So the first definition is what? A mysterious process where the purely passive reception of sense data leads to hypothesis formation.
The critrat world has eloquent arguments against that version of induction, although no one has believed in a for a long time.
the answer may be; because “induction” is sometimes defined to be whatever kind of thing theories come out of)
Well, only sometimes.
CR doesn’t have good arguments against the other kind of induction, the kind that just predicts future observations on the basis of past ones , the kind that simple organisms and algorithms can do. And it doesnt have much motivation to distinguish them. Being sweepingly anti inductive is their thing. They believe that they believe they hold all beliefs tentatively..but that doesn’t include the anti inductive belief.
CR doesn’t have good arguments against the other kind of induction, the kind that just predicts future observations on the basis of past ones , the kind that simple organisms and algorithms can do.
This is the old kind of induction; Bertrand Russell had arguments against that kind of induction...
The refutations of that kind of induction are way beyond the bounds of CR.
It’s worse than that: SI doesn’t even try to build a meaningful ontological model.
Hm, does it need one?
Why can’t it be both?
I think that’s what I said.
So the first definition is what?
Again, “what was, will continue”. DD says something about real years never having started with 20 therefore the year 2000 wont happen, which seems to refute it as a complete specification, but on reflection I just feel like he understood it in an overly crude way because he wasn’t thinking in a probabilistic way about managing the coexistence of competing theories that agree with past data but make different predictions about the future, and he still probably doesn’t have that.
The reality is, you actually aren’t supposed to have certainty that the year 2000 will happen, 0 and 1 are not real probabilities etc
It’s worse than that: SI doesn’t even try to build a meaningful ontological model.
Hm, does it need one
Yes, if you are going to claim that it solves the problem of attaching objective probabilities to ontological theories..or theories for short. If what it actually delivers is complexity measures on computer programs, it would be honest to say so.
It’s worse than that: SI doesn’t even try to build a meaningful ontological model.
Why can’t it be both?
So the first definition is what? A mysterious process where the purely passive reception of sense data leads to hypothesis formation.
The critrat world has eloquent arguments against that version of induction, although no one has believed in a for a long time.
Well, only sometimes.
CR doesn’t have good arguments against the other kind of induction, the kind that just predicts future observations on the basis of past ones , the kind that simple organisms and algorithms can do. And it doesnt have much motivation to distinguish them. Being sweepingly anti inductive is their thing. They believe that they believe they hold all beliefs tentatively..but that doesn’t include the anti inductive belief.
This is the old kind of induction; Bertrand Russell had arguments against that kind of induction...
The refutations of that kind of induction are way beyond the bounds of CR.
Looks like the simple organisms and algorithms didn’t listen to him!
I don’t think you’re taking this seriously.
Hm, does it need one?
I think that’s what I said.
Again, “what was, will continue”. DD says something about real years never having started with 20 therefore the year 2000 wont happen, which seems to refute it as a complete specification, but on reflection I just feel like he understood it in an overly crude way because he wasn’t thinking in a probabilistic way about managing the coexistence of competing theories that agree with past data but make different predictions about the future, and he still probably doesn’t have that.
The reality is, you actually aren’t supposed to have certainty that the year 2000 will happen, 0 and 1 are not real probabilities etc
Sigh ..that takes me back about 11 years. Yes, induction is always straw manned, the Popper-Miller paper is gold plated truth, etc.
Yes, if you are going to claim that it solves the problem of attaching objective probabilities to ontological theories..or theories for short. If what it actually delivers is complexity measures on computer programs, it would be honest to say so.