If you say that free will and consciousness are by definition non-physical, then if course naturalist explanations explain them away.
Object level reply: I don’t. Most contemporary philosophers don’t. If you see that sort of thing it is almost certainly a straw man.
meta level reply: And naturally idealists reject any notion of matter except as a bundle of sensation. Just because something is normal and natural, does not mean it is normatively correct. It is normal and natural to be tribal, biased and otherwise irrational. Immunity to evidence is a Bad Thing from the point of view of rationality.
But you can also choose to define the terms to encompass what you think is really going on
You can if you really know, but confusing assumptions and knowledge is another Bad Thing. We know that atoms can be split, so redefining an atom to be a divisible unit of matter.
I’m definitely signed up for compatibilism on free will and have been for many years
Explaining compatibilist free will is automatically explaining away libertarian free will.
So what is the case against libertarian free will? It isn’t false because of naturalism, since it isn’t supernatural by definition—and because naturalism needs to be defeasible to mean anything. EY dismisses libertarian free will out of hand. That is not knowledge.
but I don’t yet feel 100% comfortable calling Graziano’s ideas “consciousness” (as he does), or if I do call it that, I’m not sure which of my intuitions and associations about “consciousness” are still applicable.
What would it take for it to be false? If the answer is “nothing”, then you are looking at suppression of evidence.
Sorry for being sloppy, you can ignore what I said about “non-physical”, I really just meant the more general point that “consciousness doesn’t exist (if consciousness is defined as X)” is the same statement as “consciousness does not mean X, but rather Y”, and I shouldn’t have said “non-physical” at all. You sorta responded to that more general point, although I’m interested in whether you can say more about how exactly you define consciousness such that illusionism is not consciousness. (As I mentioned, I’m not sure I’ll disagree with your definition!)
What would it take for it to be false?
I think that if attention schema theory can explain every thought and feeling I have about consciousness (as in my silly example conversation in the “meta-problem of consciousness” section), then there’s nothing left to explain. I don’t see any way around that. I would be looking for (1) some observable thought / behavior that AST cannot explain, (2) some reason to think those explanations are wrong, or (3) a good argument that true philosophical zombies are sensible, i.e. that you can have two systems whose every observable thought / behavior is identical but exactly one of them is conscious, or (4) some broader framework of thinking that accepts the AST story as far as it goes, and offers a different way to think about it intuitively and contextualize it.
I really just meant the more general point that “consciousness doesn’t exist (if consciousness is defined as X)” is the same statement as “consciousness does not mean X, but rather Y”
If you stipulate that consciousness means Y consciousness, not X consciousness, you haven’t proven anything about X consciousness.
If I stipulate that when I say, “duck”, I mean mallards, I imply nothing about the existential status of muscovys or teals. In order to figure out what is, real you have to look, not juggle definitions.
If you have an infallible way of establishing what really exists, that in some way bypasses language, and a normative rule that every term must have a realworld referent, then you might be in a place where you you can say what a word really means.
Otherwise, language is just custom.
I’m interested in whether you can say more about how exactly you define consciousness such that illusionism is not consciousness. (As I mentioned, I’m not sure I’ll disagree with your definition!)
Illusionism is not consciousness because it is a theory of consciousness.
Illusionism explicitly does not explain consciousness as typically defined, but instead switches the topic to third person reports of consciousness.
Edit1:
I think that if attention schema theory can explain every thought and feeling I have about consciousness (as in my silly example conversation in the “meta-problem of consciousness” section), then there’s nothing left to explain
Explaining consciousness as part of the hard problem of consciousness is different to explaining-away consciousness (or explaining reports of consciousness) as part of the meta problem of consciousness.
Edit2:
There are two ways of not knowing the correct explanation of something:
the way where no one has any idea, and the way where everyone has an idea… but no one knows which explanation is right because they are explaining different things in different ways.
Having an explanation is only useful in the first situation. Otherwise, the whole problem is the difference between “an explanation” and “the explanation”.
Explaining consciousness as part of the hard problem of consciousness is different to explaining-away consciousness (or explaining reports of consciousness) as part of the meta problem of consciousness.
I commented here why I think that it shouldn’t be possible to fully explain reports of consciousness without also fully explaining the hard problem of consciousness in the process of doing so. I take it you disagree (correct?) but do you see where I’m coming from? Can you be more specific about how you think about that?
Object level reply: I don’t. Most contemporary philosophers don’t. If you see that sort of thing it is almost certainly a straw man.
meta level reply: And naturally idealists reject any notion of matter except as a bundle of sensation. Just because something is normal and natural, does not mean it is normatively correct. It is normal and natural to be tribal, biased and otherwise irrational. Immunity to evidence is a Bad Thing from the point of view of rationality.
You can if you really know, but confusing assumptions and knowledge is another Bad Thing. We know that atoms can be split, so redefining an atom to be a divisible unit of matter.
Explaining compatibilist free will is automatically explaining away libertarian free will. So what is the case against libertarian free will? It isn’t false because of naturalism, since it isn’t supernatural by definition—and because naturalism needs to be defeasible to mean anything. EY dismisses libertarian free will out of hand. That is not knowledge.
What would it take for it to be false? If the answer is “nothing”, then you are looking at suppression of evidence.
Sorry for being sloppy, you can ignore what I said about “non-physical”, I really just meant the more general point that “consciousness doesn’t exist (if consciousness is defined as X)” is the same statement as “consciousness does not mean X, but rather Y”, and I shouldn’t have said “non-physical” at all. You sorta responded to that more general point, although I’m interested in whether you can say more about how exactly you define consciousness such that illusionism is not consciousness. (As I mentioned, I’m not sure I’ll disagree with your definition!)
I think that if attention schema theory can explain every thought and feeling I have about consciousness (as in my silly example conversation in the “meta-problem of consciousness” section), then there’s nothing left to explain. I don’t see any way around that. I would be looking for (1) some observable thought / behavior that AST cannot explain, (2) some reason to think those explanations are wrong, or (3) a good argument that true philosophical zombies are sensible, i.e. that you can have two systems whose every observable thought / behavior is identical but exactly one of them is conscious, or (4) some broader framework of thinking that accepts the AST story as far as it goes, and offers a different way to think about it intuitively and contextualize it.
If you stipulate that consciousness means Y consciousness, not X consciousness, you haven’t proven anything about X consciousness.
If I stipulate that when I say, “duck”, I mean mallards, I imply nothing about the existential status of muscovys or teals. In order to figure out what is, real you have to look, not juggle definitions.
If you have an infallible way of establishing what really exists, that in some way bypasses language, and a normative rule that every term must have a realworld referent, then you might be in a place where you you can say what a word really means.
Otherwise, language is just custom.
Illusionism is not consciousness because it is a theory of consciousness.
Illusionism explicitly does not explain consciousness as typically defined, but instead switches the topic to third person reports of consciousness.
Edit1:
Explaining consciousness as part of the hard problem of consciousness is different to explaining-away consciousness (or explaining reports of consciousness) as part of the meta problem of consciousness.
Edit2:
There are two ways of not knowing the correct explanation of something: the way where no one has any idea, and the way where everyone has an idea… but no one knows which explanation is right because they are explaining different things in different ways.
Having an explanation is only useful in the first situation. Otherwise, the whole problem is the difference between “an explanation” and “the explanation”.
I commented here why I think that it shouldn’t be possible to fully explain reports of consciousness without also fully explaining the hard problem of consciousness in the process of doing so. I take it you disagree (correct?) but do you see where I’m coming from? Can you be more specific about how you think about that?