If you really want to explore this, figuring out the difference between other allowed and disallowed trades in various philosophies would be a good start. Prostitution, child labor, payment for (one’s own) organs, and payment for keeping secrets (blackmail) are all things that on the face of it seem like private transactions with not much justification for preventing. But all are prohibited in some or all cultures.
I’m also curious if you think we should enforce the return of payment and reimbursement of expenses for fraudulent contracts. Accepting payment and valuable services, and then not performing according to the contract, seems like a crime in itself.
You could also go down the identity route—are the parties who (voluntarily, we presume) made the agreement actually the same moral entities as those who seek to nullify the contract? Is a mother-to-be the same person as a new mother? She may not understand her future-instance’s emotions or preferences enough to be able to make binding decisions.
But don’t take that too far, or you’ll realize that the fiction of agreements and contracts isn’t a moral issue, but a practical legal issue—things fall apart if you don’t pretend that people are more responsible for their situation than they actually are. “consider the equilibrium” is basically Posner’s argument, and it’s pretty strong.
If you really want to explore this, figuring out the difference between other allowed and disallowed trades in various philosophies would be a good start. Prostitution, child labor, payment for (one’s own) organs, and payment for keeping secrets (blackmail) are all things that on the face of it seem like private transactions with not much justification for preventing. But all are prohibited in some or all cultures.
I’m also curious if you think we should enforce the return of payment and reimbursement of expenses for fraudulent contracts. Accepting payment and valuable services, and then not performing according to the contract, seems like a crime in itself.
You could also go down the identity route—are the parties who (voluntarily, we presume) made the agreement actually the same moral entities as those who seek to nullify the contract? Is a mother-to-be the same person as a new mother? She may not understand her future-instance’s emotions or preferences enough to be able to make binding decisions.
But don’t take that too far, or you’ll realize that the fiction of agreements and contracts isn’t a moral issue, but a practical legal issue—things fall apart if you don’t pretend that people are more responsible for their situation than they actually are. “consider the equilibrium” is basically Posner’s argument, and it’s pretty strong.
I’ll sleep on it. Good suggestions. Thanks!