Cryonics as an effective altruism target can capture resources that would otherwise be unavailable to beneficial causes.
The average effective altruist, in determining where their marginal unit of resources will do the most good, should wish to devote themselves to charitable causes that are currently underfunded relative to the amount of good they can do. Every contribution changes this equation, as charities run out of low hanging fruit to pursue. GiveWell discusses this as the scalability limitation. A side effect of the rapid improvement in quality of life is that our opportunities for cheap dramatic improvements are decreasing over time. This has lead to differing viewpoints within the effective altruism community. There are those who wish to save lives now and those who wish to ensure future lives. Those who work on existential risk forego gained QALYs (quality adjusted life years) now in favor of small reductions in the probability of losing huge numbers of QALYs. The reasoning that argues for and against these positions is too complex to discuss at length here.
Cryonics is popular among the second group of people as it offers a similar deal, a small probability of gaining a huge number of QALYs. Analysis of whether this gain is at all comparable to the near certain QALYs one can buy for others in the present is swamped by uncertainty in several of the terms. For the sake of argument, let us be charitable to the idea that in the future humans will have extreme longevity, meaning the QALYs of a single revived cryonics patient will swamp the QALYs of a life or many lives saved now. Unfortunately even given this caveat cryonics doesn’t fare too well. The issue is that the lives saved now could also potentially have extreme longevity. Saving a single additional life now might result in multiple additional people, each of which might experience an extreme number of QALYs. If we are sympathetic to small probabilities of huge returns, we must include this possibility in the utilitarian calculation. Thus we see that individual cryonic preservation will most likely not be the most effective use of marginal resources.
Fortunately, we are not limited to calculations made on an individual basis. The very existence of GiveWell indicates that the most effective thing to do may be to influence the behavior of others. Whose behavior might we care about and why? The first group are people who are working on basic research in brain preservation and scanning. Outside of cryonics focused organizations, little to no work is being done in this area. This is important as the results of this research potentially move the date at which humans experience extreme longevity forward. The expected gains from this can be quite large, as some percentage of the human populace will die each day. Moving extreme longevity forward by even a single day could thus result in a huge reduction of lost QALYs. While it is plausible that one could contribute to such research without contributing to cryonics, this is unlikely for the vast majority of people. If we are devoting our own resources towards convincing others, we care most about the marginal case, the person with significant resources who would not otherwise have contributed. The case in which one convinces a wealthy person to sign up for cryonics and thus becomes invested in advances in basic cryonic research is one in which the date for extreme human longevity could potentially be moved forward by years. One might argue that the same effort would be better spent convincing such people to contribute to longevity promoting technologies in general, but elderly people are less likely to be interested in far-off technological improvements unless they have some chance of gaining their benefits.
Convincing such people has several knock-on effects. A person who believes they will live longer has a lower time preference and thus will likely make other decisions that positively impact the future. It makes it somewhat more likely that other wealthy people in their peer group will also become interested in longevity. If longevity promoting technologies become accepted among high status people, that will channel even more interest and resources into the field that would not otherwise have been there. The potentially largest side effect of moving the date of extreme longevity forward is that it also reduces existential risk. We are at risk for extinction largely because we are so fragile. Tech that makes humans more robust will alleviate some of these risks partially or entirely. Experiencing this enhanced robustness earlier in time exposes us to less overall risk.
Lastly, why might an individual sign up for cryonics anyway rather than contribute to longevity promoting technology in spite of our previous analysis? They might do so if it allows them to help or remain more motivated about altruist goals. Convincing someone else to sign up for cryonics will be easier if one is signed up oneself and one is happy and motivated about this decision. Determining whether or not this is true is a highly individual decision. It is worth noting that signing up significantly decreases stress for some which, coupled with low cost, could easily cause it to pay for itself. On the other hand, a young person with a low probability of dying in the near future is probably better off overall contributing to longevity tech in general rather than signing up for cryonics. Organizations such as the Brain Preservation Foundation for instance are potentially effective targets in that they are underfunded relative to other longevity promoting organizations such as SENS. While analysis of which particular branches of research needs more inquiry, the potential gains are large in that most research in this area is so poorly funded that an individual donor can actually fund projects that would simply not have happened without them.
As cryonic research efforts continue and other low hanging-fruit in increasing QALYs are exhausted, cryonics could well reach a crossover point where preserving the individual does become the best possible use of resources. When that point is reached will be somewhat subjective based on the perceived probability of success in cryonic revivification. The perceived chance of success will increase due to the efforts of cryonics research in things like the successful revivification of a mouse for instance. As this happens much of the increased potential QALYs will be “free” in that cryonics will be able to replace existing expensive medical treatment with a lower cost alternative. This threshold will move over time. If euthanasia laws continue to improve, cryonics might be a cheaper alternative for some terminally ill people in the immediate future. But this calculation would have to be made when actually ill rather than funding cryonics through life insurance as is usually the case currently.
Cryonics seems like low-hanging fruit for humanity in the interim between now and when we achieve extreme longevity. Those trying to do the most good should investigate whether or not they personally can persuade additional resources to contribute towards cryonics research. While some may argue that all resources should go towards convincing people to donate towards more guaranteed QALYs now, they should recognize that self-interest is a powerful motivator for most people.
What do you think of the argument that cryonics doesn’t create many additional QALYs because by revival time we’ve probably hit Malthusian limits? So any revived cryonics patients would be traded off against other future lives?
This depends on your flavor of utilitarianism. Some are indifferent to trading between two equally good lives. I regard killing someone who currently has preferences and replacing them with a new person to be lost QALYs.
Depending on your flavor of utilitarianism that could be lost utility, but it’s strange to call it lost QALYs. A QALY is just a length of time in years weighted by how good it is. Two people leading happy lives for 1000 years is the same number of QALYs as twenty people leading happy lives for 100. (Death does bring suffering to both the person dying and the people they leave behind, thus decreasing QALYs, but this is a relatively small fraction of the suffering someone has over the course of their life.)
Cryonics as an effective altruism target can capture resources that would otherwise be unavailable to beneficial causes.
The average effective altruist, in determining where their marginal unit of resources will do the most good, should wish to devote themselves to charitable causes that are currently underfunded relative to the amount of good they can do. Every contribution changes this equation, as charities run out of low hanging fruit to pursue. GiveWell discusses this as the scalability limitation. A side effect of the rapid improvement in quality of life is that our opportunities for cheap dramatic improvements are decreasing over time. This has lead to differing viewpoints within the effective altruism community. There are those who wish to save lives now and those who wish to ensure future lives. Those who work on existential risk forego gained QALYs (quality adjusted life years) now in favor of small reductions in the probability of losing huge numbers of QALYs. The reasoning that argues for and against these positions is too complex to discuss at length here.
Cryonics is popular among the second group of people as it offers a similar deal, a small probability of gaining a huge number of QALYs. Analysis of whether this gain is at all comparable to the near certain QALYs one can buy for others in the present is swamped by uncertainty in several of the terms. For the sake of argument, let us be charitable to the idea that in the future humans will have extreme longevity, meaning the QALYs of a single revived cryonics patient will swamp the QALYs of a life or many lives saved now. Unfortunately even given this caveat cryonics doesn’t fare too well. The issue is that the lives saved now could also potentially have extreme longevity. Saving a single additional life now might result in multiple additional people, each of which might experience an extreme number of QALYs. If we are sympathetic to small probabilities of huge returns, we must include this possibility in the utilitarian calculation. Thus we see that individual cryonic preservation will most likely not be the most effective use of marginal resources.
Fortunately, we are not limited to calculations made on an individual basis. The very existence of GiveWell indicates that the most effective thing to do may be to influence the behavior of others. Whose behavior might we care about and why? The first group are people who are working on basic research in brain preservation and scanning. Outside of cryonics focused organizations, little to no work is being done in this area. This is important as the results of this research potentially move the date at which humans experience extreme longevity forward. The expected gains from this can be quite large, as some percentage of the human populace will die each day. Moving extreme longevity forward by even a single day could thus result in a huge reduction of lost QALYs. While it is plausible that one could contribute to such research without contributing to cryonics, this is unlikely for the vast majority of people. If we are devoting our own resources towards convincing others, we care most about the marginal case, the person with significant resources who would not otherwise have contributed. The case in which one convinces a wealthy person to sign up for cryonics and thus becomes invested in advances in basic cryonic research is one in which the date for extreme human longevity could potentially be moved forward by years. One might argue that the same effort would be better spent convincing such people to contribute to longevity promoting technologies in general, but elderly people are less likely to be interested in far-off technological improvements unless they have some chance of gaining their benefits.
Convincing such people has several knock-on effects. A person who believes they will live longer has a lower time preference and thus will likely make other decisions that positively impact the future. It makes it somewhat more likely that other wealthy people in their peer group will also become interested in longevity. If longevity promoting technologies become accepted among high status people, that will channel even more interest and resources into the field that would not otherwise have been there. The potentially largest side effect of moving the date of extreme longevity forward is that it also reduces existential risk. We are at risk for extinction largely because we are so fragile. Tech that makes humans more robust will alleviate some of these risks partially or entirely. Experiencing this enhanced robustness earlier in time exposes us to less overall risk.
Lastly, why might an individual sign up for cryonics anyway rather than contribute to longevity promoting technology in spite of our previous analysis? They might do so if it allows them to help or remain more motivated about altruist goals. Convincing someone else to sign up for cryonics will be easier if one is signed up oneself and one is happy and motivated about this decision. Determining whether or not this is true is a highly individual decision. It is worth noting that signing up significantly decreases stress for some which, coupled with low cost, could easily cause it to pay for itself. On the other hand, a young person with a low probability of dying in the near future is probably better off overall contributing to longevity tech in general rather than signing up for cryonics. Organizations such as the Brain Preservation Foundation for instance are potentially effective targets in that they are underfunded relative to other longevity promoting organizations such as SENS. While analysis of which particular branches of research needs more inquiry, the potential gains are large in that most research in this area is so poorly funded that an individual donor can actually fund projects that would simply not have happened without them.
As cryonic research efforts continue and other low hanging-fruit in increasing QALYs are exhausted, cryonics could well reach a crossover point where preserving the individual does become the best possible use of resources. When that point is reached will be somewhat subjective based on the perceived probability of success in cryonic revivification. The perceived chance of success will increase due to the efforts of cryonics research in things like the successful revivification of a mouse for instance. As this happens much of the increased potential QALYs will be “free” in that cryonics will be able to replace existing expensive medical treatment with a lower cost alternative. This threshold will move over time. If euthanasia laws continue to improve, cryonics might be a cheaper alternative for some terminally ill people in the immediate future. But this calculation would have to be made when actually ill rather than funding cryonics through life insurance as is usually the case currently.
Cryonics seems like low-hanging fruit for humanity in the interim between now and when we achieve extreme longevity. Those trying to do the most good should investigate whether or not they personally can persuade additional resources to contribute towards cryonics research. While some may argue that all resources should go towards convincing people to donate towards more guaranteed QALYs now, they should recognize that self-interest is a powerful motivator for most people.
Nice!
What do you think of the argument that cryonics doesn’t create many additional QALYs because by revival time we’ve probably hit Malthusian limits? So any revived cryonics patients would be traded off against other future lives?
This depends on your flavor of utilitarianism. Some are indifferent to trading between two equally good lives. I regard killing someone who currently has preferences and replacing them with a new person to be lost QALYs.
Depending on your flavor of utilitarianism that could be lost utility, but it’s strange to call it lost QALYs. A QALY is just a length of time in years weighted by how good it is. Two people leading happy lives for 1000 years is the same number of QALYs as twenty people leading happy lives for 100. (Death does bring suffering to both the person dying and the people they leave behind, thus decreasing QALYs, but this is a relatively small fraction of the suffering someone has over the course of their life.)
karma sink: since voting is being handled by upvotes rather than a poll downvote this if you upvoted my essay.
Upvoting essays you think are good is close enough to the normal way things work that you don’t need a karma sink.