The problem with biosecurity is that most people working in the field are aligned with universities that do dangerous research. As a result they are more like the computer security department of a big company than they are like independent hackers in the field of computer security.
It seems that the position of the biosafety EA people is that if someone would actually act like a computer security hacker, they would be completely shunned and not have the reputation to achieve anything in that field.
There’s a EA post that speaks about how a lot of research that’s done is gain of function research and that anyone who speaks with biosafety people should not speak about gain of function and instead enhanced potential pandemic pathogens. That because most of the research in the field includes gain of function research.
This basically mean that everyone in the field knows that Fauci perjured himself when claiming that there’s no gain-of-function research in Wuhan but everyone in the field is afraid to do so.
The NIH saying that the research in Wuhan somehow wasn’t on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens because the coronavirus (and thus it was somehow justified to fund it while the moratorium was in place) on which they worked wasn’t a human illness was pretty bullshit.
It should be obvious to everyone that it’s bullshit if you have a transparent conversation about it. A lot of people in power in the field have a lot to lose if there’s an open debate and thus do everything not to have that debate. Unfortunately, it might be correct that a biosafety EA would burn to many bridges when speaking honestly and transparently.
What if one day a biosecurity expert in Moscow or Beijing or New Delhi, etc., starts speaking honestly and transparently? Even about potentially deleterious topics?
It seems like that’s an even more dangerous scenario since it would naturally inflame existing geopolitical tensions and also spur a sudden rush to release huge amounts of info in order to salvage credibility in the eyes of the public.
The problem with biosecurity is that most people working in the field are aligned with universities that do dangerous research. As a result they are more like the computer security department of a big company than they are like independent hackers in the field of computer security.
It seems that the position of the biosafety EA people is that if someone would actually act like a computer security hacker, they would be completely shunned and not have the reputation to achieve anything in that field.
There’s a EA post that speaks about how a lot of research that’s done is gain of function research and that anyone who speaks with biosafety people should not speak about gain of function and instead enhanced potential pandemic pathogens. That because most of the research in the field includes gain of function research.
This basically mean that everyone in the field knows that Fauci perjured himself when claiming that there’s no gain-of-function research in Wuhan but everyone in the field is afraid to do so.
The NIH saying that the research in Wuhan somehow wasn’t on enhanced potential pandemic pathogens because the coronavirus (and thus it was somehow justified to fund it while the moratorium was in place) on which they worked wasn’t a human illness was pretty bullshit.
It should be obvious to everyone that it’s bullshit if you have a transparent conversation about it. A lot of people in power in the field have a lot to lose if there’s an open debate and thus do everything not to have that debate. Unfortunately, it might be correct that a biosafety EA would burn to many bridges when speaking honestly and transparently.
What if one day a biosecurity expert in Moscow or Beijing or New Delhi, etc., starts speaking honestly and transparently? Even about potentially deleterious topics?
It seems like that’s an even more dangerous scenario since it would naturally inflame existing geopolitical tensions and also spur a sudden rush to release huge amounts of info in order to salvage credibility in the eyes of the public.