I’m not sure that I follow. Can anything we talk about be reduced to less than the basic stimuli we notice ourselves having?
All words (that mean anything) refer to something. When I talk about ‘guitars’, I remember experiences I’ve had which I associate with the word (i.e. guitars). Most humans have similar makeups, in that we learn in similar ways, and experience in similar ways (I’m just talking about the psychological unity of humans, and how far our brain design is from, say, mice). So, we can talk about things, because we’ve learnt to refer certain experiences (words) to others (guitars).
Neither of the two can refer to anything other to the experiences we have. Anything we talk about is in relation to our experiences (Or possibly even meaningless).
Most of the classic reductions are reductions to things beneath perceivable stimuli,eg heat to molecular motion. Reductionism and physialism would be in very bad trouble if language and concpetualistion grounded out where perception does. The theory also mispredicts that we woul be able communicate our sensations , but struggle
to communicate abstract (eg mathemataical) ideas with a distant rleationship, or no relationship to senssation. In fact, the classic reductions are to the basic entities of phyiscs, which are ultimately defined mathematically, and often hard to hard to visualise or otherwise relate to sensation.
You could point out the different constituents of experience that feel fundamental, but they themselves (e.g. Red) don’t feel as though they are made up of anything more than themselves.
When we talk about atoms, however, that isn’t a basic piece of mind that mind can talk about. My mind feels as though it is constituted of qualia, and it can refer to atoms. I don’t experience an atom, I experience large groups of them, in complex arrangements. I can refer to the atom using larger, complex arrangements of neurons (atoms). Even though, when my mind asks what the basic parts of reality are, it has a chain of reference pointing to atoms, each part of that chain is a set of neural connections, that don’t feel reducible.
Even on reflection, our experiences reduce to qualia. We deduce that qualia are made of atoms, but that doesn’t mean that our experience feels like its been reduced to atoms.
I’m saying that we should expect experience to feel as if made of fundamental, ineffable parts, even though we know that it is not. So, qualia aren’t the problem for a turing machine they appear to be.
Also, we all share these experience ‘parts’ with most other humans, due to the psychological unity of humankind. So, if we’re all sat down at an early age, and drilled with certain patterns of mind parts (times-tables), then we should expect to be able to draw upon them at ease.
My original point, however, was just that the map isn’t the territory. Qualia don’t get special attention just because they feel different. They have a perfectly natural explanation, and you don’t get to make game-changing claims about the territory until you’ve made sure your map is pretty spot-on.
I’m saying that we should expect experience to feel as if made of fundamental, ineffable parts, even though we know that it is not.
I don ’t see why. Saying that eperience is really complex neurall activity isn’t enough to explain that, because thought
is really complex neural activity as well, and we can comminicate and unpack concepts.
So, qualia aren’t the problem for a turing machine they appear to be.
Can you write the code for SeeRed() ? Or are you saying that TMs would have ineffable concepts?
. Qualia don’t get special attention just because they feel different. They have a perfectly natural explanation,
You’ve inverted the problem: you have creatd the expectation that nothing mental is effable.
No, I’m saying that no basic, mental part will feel effable. Using our cognition, we can make complex notions of atoms and guitars, built up in our minds, and these will explain why our mental aspects feel fundamental, but they will still feel fundamental.
I’m saying that there are (something like) certain constructs in the brain, that are used whenever the most simple conscious thought or feeling is expressed. They’re even used when we don’t choose to express something, like when we look at something. We immediately see it’s components (surfaces, legs, handles), and the ones we can’t break down (lines, colours) feel like the most basic parts of those representations in our minds.
Perhaps the construct that we identify as red, is set of neurons XYZ firing. If so, whenever we notice (that is, other sets of neurons observe) that XYZ go off, we just take it to be ‘red’. It really appears to be red, and none of the other workings of the neurons can break it any further. It feels ineffable, because we are not privy to everything that’s going on. We can simply use a very restricted portion of the brain, to examine other chunks, and give them different labels.
However, we can use other neuronal patterns, to refer to and talk about atoms. Large groups of complex neural firings can observe and reflect upon experimental results that show that the brain is made of atoms.
Now, even though we can build up a model of atoms, and prove that the basic features of conscious experience (redness, lines, the hearing of a middle C) are made of atoms, the fact is, we’re still using complex neuronal patterns to think about these. The atom may be fundamental, but it takes a lot of complexity for me to think about the atom. Consciousness really is reducible to atoms, but when I inspect consciousness, it still feels like a big complex set of neurons that my conscious brain can’t understand. It still feels fundamental.
Experientially, redness doesn’t feel like atoms because our conscious minds cannot reduce it in experience, but they can prove that it is reducible. People make the jump that, because complex patterns in one part of the brain (one conscious part) cannot reduce another (conscious) part to mere atoms, it must be a fundamental part of reality. However, this does not follow logically—you can’t assume your conscious experience can comprehend everything you think and feel at the most fundamental level, purely by reflection.
I feel I’ve gone on too long, in trying to give an example of how something could feel basic but not be. I’m just saying we’re not privy to everything that’s going on, so we can’t make massive knowledge claims about it i.e. that a turing-machine couldn’t experience what we’re experiencing, purely by appeal to reflection. We just aren’t reflectively transparent.
I’m not sure that I follow. Can anything we talk about be reduced to less than the basic stimuli we notice ourselves having?
All words (that mean anything) refer to something. When I talk about ‘guitars’, I remember experiences I’ve had which I associate with the word (i.e. guitars). Most humans have similar makeups, in that we learn in similar ways, and experience in similar ways (I’m just talking about the psychological unity of humans, and how far our brain design is from, say, mice). So, we can talk about things, because we’ve learnt to refer certain experiences (words) to others (guitars).
Neither of the two can refer to anything other to the experiences we have. Anything we talk about is in relation to our experiences (Or possibly even meaningless).
Most of the classic reductions are reductions to things beneath perceivable stimuli,eg heat to molecular motion. Reductionism and physialism would be in very bad trouble if language and concpetualistion grounded out where perception does. The theory also mispredicts that we woul be able communicate our sensations , but struggle to communicate abstract (eg mathemataical) ideas with a distant rleationship, or no relationship to senssation. In fact, the classic reductions are to the basic entities of phyiscs, which are ultimately defined mathematically, and often hard to hard to visualise or otherwise relate to sensation.
You could point out the different constituents of experience that feel fundamental, but they themselves (e.g. Red) don’t feel as though they are made up of anything more than themselves.
When we talk about atoms, however, that isn’t a basic piece of mind that mind can talk about. My mind feels as though it is constituted of qualia, and it can refer to atoms. I don’t experience an atom, I experience large groups of them, in complex arrangements. I can refer to the atom using larger, complex arrangements of neurons (atoms). Even though, when my mind asks what the basic parts of reality are, it has a chain of reference pointing to atoms, each part of that chain is a set of neural connections, that don’t feel reducible.
Even on reflection, our experiences reduce to qualia. We deduce that qualia are made of atoms, but that doesn’t mean that our experience feels like its been reduced to atoms.
Where is that heading? Is it supposed to tell my why qualia are ineffable....or rather, why qualia are more ineffable than cognition?
I’m saying that we should expect experience to feel as if made of fundamental, ineffable parts, even though we know that it is not. So, qualia aren’t the problem for a turing machine they appear to be.
Also, we all share these experience ‘parts’ with most other humans, due to the psychological unity of humankind. So, if we’re all sat down at an early age, and drilled with certain patterns of mind parts (times-tables), then we should expect to be able to draw upon them at ease.
My original point, however, was just that the map isn’t the territory. Qualia don’t get special attention just because they feel different. They have a perfectly natural explanation, and you don’t get to make game-changing claims about the territory until you’ve made sure your map is pretty spot-on.
I don ’t see why. Saying that eperience is really complex neurall activity isn’t enough to explain that, because thought is really complex neural activity as well, and we can comminicate and unpack concepts.
Can you write the code for SeeRed() ? Or are you saying that TMs would have ineffable concepts?
You’ve inverted the problem: you have creatd the expectation that nothing mental is effable.
No, I’m saying that no basic, mental part will feel effable. Using our cognition, we can make complex notions of atoms and guitars, built up in our minds, and these will explain why our mental aspects feel fundamental, but they will still feel fundamental.
I’m not continuing this discussion, it’s going nowhere new. I will offer Orthonormal’s sequence on qualia as explanatory however: http://lesswrong.com/lw/5n9/seeing_red_dissolving_marys_room_and_qualia/
You seem to be hinting, but are not quite saying, that qualia are basic and therefore ineffable, whilst thoughts are non-basic and therefore effable.
Confirming the above would be somewhere new.
I’m saying that there are (something like) certain constructs in the brain, that are used whenever the most simple conscious thought or feeling is expressed. They’re even used when we don’t choose to express something, like when we look at something. We immediately see it’s components (surfaces, legs, handles), and the ones we can’t break down (lines, colours) feel like the most basic parts of those representations in our minds.
Perhaps the construct that we identify as red, is set of neurons XYZ firing. If so, whenever we notice (that is, other sets of neurons observe) that XYZ go off, we just take it to be ‘red’. It really appears to be red, and none of the other workings of the neurons can break it any further. It feels ineffable, because we are not privy to everything that’s going on. We can simply use a very restricted portion of the brain, to examine other chunks, and give them different labels.
However, we can use other neuronal patterns, to refer to and talk about atoms. Large groups of complex neural firings can observe and reflect upon experimental results that show that the brain is made of atoms.
Now, even though we can build up a model of atoms, and prove that the basic features of conscious experience (redness, lines, the hearing of a middle C) are made of atoms, the fact is, we’re still using complex neuronal patterns to think about these. The atom may be fundamental, but it takes a lot of complexity for me to think about the atom. Consciousness really is reducible to atoms, but when I inspect consciousness, it still feels like a big complex set of neurons that my conscious brain can’t understand. It still feels fundamental.
Experientially, redness doesn’t feel like atoms because our conscious minds cannot reduce it in experience, but they can prove that it is reducible. People make the jump that, because complex patterns in one part of the brain (one conscious part) cannot reduce another (conscious) part to mere atoms, it must be a fundamental part of reality. However, this does not follow logically—you can’t assume your conscious experience can comprehend everything you think and feel at the most fundamental level, purely by reflection.
I feel I’ve gone on too long, in trying to give an example of how something could feel basic but not be. I’m just saying we’re not privy to everything that’s going on, so we can’t make massive knowledge claims about it i.e. that a turing-machine couldn’t experience what we’re experiencing, purely by appeal to reflection. We just aren’t reflectively transparent.