Or maybe Searle is tackling a much harder version of the problem, for instance explaining how things like human rights and ethics can be binding or obligatory on people when they are “all in the mind”, explaining why one person should be beholden to another’s mind projection.
Note that “should be beholden” is a concept from within an ethical system; so invoking it in reference to an entire ethical system is a category error.
Also, I feel that the sequences do pretty well at explaining the instrumental reasons that agents with goals have ethics; even ethics which may, in some circumstances, prohibit reaching their goals.
Or maybe Searle is tackling a much harder version of the problem, for instance explaining how things like human rights and ethics can be binding or obligatory on people when they are “all in the mind”, explaining why one person should be beholden to another’s mind projection.
Note that “should be beholden” is a concept from within an ethical system; so invoking it in reference to an entire ethical system is a category error.
Also, I feel that the sequences do pretty well at explaining the instrumental reasons that agents with goals have ethics; even ethics which may, in some circumstances, prohibit reaching their goals.
Not necessarily. Many approaches to this problem try to lever an ethical “should” off a rational “should”.