Actually, I’m somewhat grateful that it was ignored (except by de Broglie), since its intuitiveness might otherwise have become such a firm orthodoxy that we wouldn’t have the rich debate between MW theorists of today.
For instance, David Deutsch’s contribution that BM is just MW with unecesary additional complexity.
Also, BM-style views predate Everett by decades, so one can’t make the case that BM is an ad-hoc distortion of MW.
Although one can still make the case that MW is BM Done Right. :-).a
If one wishes. But MW and BM give contrary answers to almost every question, in spite of their mutual empirical adequacy. They’re sufficiently distinct as to almost qualify as alien physics—incommensurate-yet-coherent in the way you might expect the theories of two independent civilizations to be. That in itself makes the act of trying to evaluate and compare the two kinds of model Bayesianly extremely useful and informative. It really gets to the heart of making some of our core priors explicit.
For instance, David Deutsch’s contribution that BM is just MW with unecesary additional complexity.
Although one can still make the case that MW is BM Done Right. :-).a
If one wishes. But MW and BM give contrary answers to almost every question, in spite of their mutual empirical adequacy. They’re sufficiently distinct as to almost qualify as alien physics—incommensurate-yet-coherent in the way you might expect the theories of two independent civilizations to be. That in itself makes the act of trying to evaluate and compare the two kinds of model Bayesianly extremely useful and informative. It really gets to the heart of making some of our core priors explicit.
You could say, for instance, that BM is nonlocal, and MW local, but that is hardly in favour of BM.