“Make things as simple as possible, but no simpler.”—Albert Einstein
How do you know whether something is as simple as possible?
In terms of publishing, should the standard be as simple as is absolutely possible, or should it be as simple as possible given time and mental constraints?
It still may be hard to resolve when something is as simple as possible.
So modal realism (the idea that possible worlds exist concretely) has been highlighted a few times in this thread as an unparsimonious theory but Lewis has two responses to this:
1.) This is (at least mostly) quantitative unparsimony not qualitative (lots of stuff, not lots of types of stuff). It’s unclear how bad quantitative unparsimony is. Specifically, Lewis argues that there is no difference between possible worlds and actual worlds (actuality is indexical) so he argues that he doesn’t postulate two types of stuff (actuality and possibility) he just postulates a lot more of the stuff that we’re already committed to. Of course, he may be committed to unicorns as well as goats (which the non-realist isn’t) but then you can ask whether he’s really committed to more fundamental stuff than we are.
2.) Lewis argues that his theory can explain things that no-one else can so even if his theory is less parsimonious, it gives rewards in return for that cost.
Now many people will argue that Lewis is wrong, perhaps on both counts but the point is that even with the case that’s been used almost as a benchmark for unparsimonious philosophy in this thread, it’s not as simple as “Lewis postulates two types of stuff when he doesn’t need to, therefore, clearly his theory is not as simple as possible.”
Would that be desirable? If a contributor can argue persuasively for dropping parsimony, why should that be suppressed?
Surely that should be modal realism.
“Make things as simple as possible, but no simpler.”—Albert Einstein
How do you know whether something is as simple as possible?
In terms of publishing, should the standard be as simple as is absolutely possible, or should it be as simple as possible given time and mental constraints?
You keep trying to make it simpler, but you fail to do so without losing something in return.
It still may be hard to resolve when something is as simple as possible.
So modal realism (the idea that possible worlds exist concretely) has been highlighted a few times in this thread as an unparsimonious theory but Lewis has two responses to this:
1.) This is (at least mostly) quantitative unparsimony not qualitative (lots of stuff, not lots of types of stuff). It’s unclear how bad quantitative unparsimony is. Specifically, Lewis argues that there is no difference between possible worlds and actual worlds (actuality is indexical) so he argues that he doesn’t postulate two types of stuff (actuality and possibility) he just postulates a lot more of the stuff that we’re already committed to. Of course, he may be committed to unicorns as well as goats (which the non-realist isn’t) but then you can ask whether he’s really committed to more fundamental stuff than we are.
2.) Lewis argues that his theory can explain things that no-one else can so even if his theory is less parsimonious, it gives rewards in return for that cost.
Now many people will argue that Lewis is wrong, perhaps on both counts but the point is that even with the case that’s been used almost as a benchmark for unparsimonious philosophy in this thread, it’s not as simple as “Lewis postulates two types of stuff when he doesn’t need to, therefore, clearly his theory is not as simple as possible.”