Whatever we say is explicable in terms of brain physics. It is enough to postulate a p-zombie-like world to explain what we say. If we didn’t experience consciousness directly, the very idea (edit: that is, of p-zombies) would never have occurred to us.
Therefore I don’t see why anyone would want or need to discuss consciousness in terms of outside observations.
If we didn’t experience consciousness directly, the very idea would never have occurred to us.
The fact that the idea occurred to us is observable from the outside—that’s pretty much the central insight behind heterophenomenology. An external observer could see for example this entire thread of discussion, and conclude that we’ve come up with an idea we call “consciousness” and some of us discuss it lots. And that’s definitely an observation that any worthwhile theory has to account for, it’s completely copper-bottomed objective truth.
If you haven’t already, have a look at the sequence on zombies especially the first couple of articles.
You may have misinterpreted my comment. I meant that if we didn’t experience consciousness directly, the idea of p-zombies would not have occurred to us.
I did misinterpret it, but it doesn’t matter because the response is almost exactly the same. The fact that the idea of p-zombies occurred to us is also observable from the outside, and is therefore copper-bottomed evidence that heterophenomenology takes into account.
If you can state the problem based on what we observe from the outside, it moves us from a rather slippery world of questions that are hard to pin down to a very straightforward hard-edged question about “does your theory predict what we observe?”. And I’m not asking whether you think this is a necessary move—I’m asking whether it’s sufficient—whether you’re still able to state the problem relying only on what you can observe from the outside.
The fundamental premise of consciousness (in its usual definitions) is, indeed, something that by definition cannot be observed from the outside. Yes, this involves a lot of problems like p-zombies. But once you prove (or assume) that you can handle the problem purely from the outside, then you’ve effectively solved (or destroyed) the problem, congratulations.
Hard Problem Of Consciousness tl;dr: “It feels like there’s something on the inside that cannot be observed from the outside...”
Not only cannot be observed from the outside, but has no observable consequences whatsoever? This whole thread isn’t a consequence of consciousness? Could you confirm for me that you mean to bite that bullet?
It’s starting to look like I or someone should do a top level article explicitly on this subject, but in the meantime, you might be interested in Dennett’s Who’s On First?.
EDIT: probably too late, but requesting downvote explanation—thanks!
Just to make clear, this isn’t my view. I’m explaining the views of other people who think “consciousness” is an extra-physical phenomenon. I started by pointing out the necessary consequences of that position, but it’s not my own position. (I said this in other threads on the subject but not here, I see now.)
And yes, if people who postulate extra-physical consciousness, AFAICS they have to bite this bullet. If consciousness is at all extra-physical, then it is completely extra-physical, and is not the cause of any physical event.
On the other hand, if consciousness was the name of some ordinary, physical, pattern, then it wouldn’t help explain the subjective experience that forms the “Hard Problem of Consciousness.”
Whatever we say is explicable in terms of brain physics. It is enough to postulate a p-zombie-like world to explain what we say. If we didn’t experience consciousness directly, the very idea (edit: that is, of p-zombies) would never have occurred to us.
Therefore I don’t see why anyone would want or need to discuss consciousness in terms of outside observations.
The fact that the idea occurred to us is observable from the outside—that’s pretty much the central insight behind heterophenomenology. An external observer could see for example this entire thread of discussion, and conclude that we’ve come up with an idea we call “consciousness” and some of us discuss it lots. And that’s definitely an observation that any worthwhile theory has to account for, it’s completely copper-bottomed objective truth.
If you haven’t already, have a look at the sequence on zombies especially the first couple of articles.
You may have misinterpreted my comment. I meant that if we didn’t experience consciousness directly, the idea of p-zombies would not have occurred to us.
I did misinterpret it, but it doesn’t matter because the response is almost exactly the same. The fact that the idea of p-zombies occurred to us is also observable from the outside, and is therefore copper-bottomed evidence that heterophenomenology takes into account.
If you can state the problem based on what we observe from the outside, it moves us from a rather slippery world of questions that are hard to pin down to a very straightforward hard-edged question about “does your theory predict what we observe?”. And I’m not asking whether you think this is a necessary move—I’m asking whether it’s sufficient—whether you’re still able to state the problem relying only on what you can observe from the outside.
The fundamental premise of consciousness (in its usual definitions) is, indeed, something that by definition cannot be observed from the outside. Yes, this involves a lot of problems like p-zombies. But once you prove (or assume) that you can handle the problem purely from the outside, then you’ve effectively solved (or destroyed) the problem, congratulations.
Hard Problem Of Consciousness tl;dr: “It feels like there’s something on the inside that cannot be observed from the outside...”
Not only cannot be observed from the outside, but has no observable consequences whatsoever? This whole thread isn’t a consequence of consciousness? Could you confirm for me that you mean to bite that bullet?
It’s starting to look like I or someone should do a top level article explicitly on this subject, but in the meantime, you might be interested in Dennett’s Who’s On First?.
EDIT: probably too late, but requesting downvote explanation—thanks!
Just to make clear, this isn’t my view. I’m explaining the views of other people who think “consciousness” is an extra-physical phenomenon. I started by pointing out the necessary consequences of that position, but it’s not my own position. (I said this in other threads on the subject but not here, I see now.)
And yes, if people who postulate extra-physical consciousness, AFAICS they have to bite this bullet. If consciousness is at all extra-physical, then it is completely extra-physical, and is not the cause of any physical event.
On the other hand, if consciousness was the name of some ordinary, physical, pattern, then it wouldn’t help explain the subjective experience that forms the “Hard Problem of Consciousness.”