Keeping in mind that I’m explaining a view with which I don’t fully agree (but I don’t hold to an alternative view either, I just don’t fully understand the matter) - I’ll try to reformulate.
We have subjective experience. It does not seem to be describe-able in ordinary physical terms, or to arise from theories of the physical world, because these theories don’t have any place for “experience” or “feeling” as seen from the inside—only as seen from the outside.
What the experience is about, the events and information we experience, is part of the physical world. Aboutness is fully explained as part of the physical world. What’s not explained is why we feel at all. Why does an algorithm feel like something from the inside? Why does it have an “inside”?
I have feelings, experiences, etc. The question being asked isn’t even why I have them. It’s more like, what are they? What ontological kind do they have?
Re: “We have subjective experience. It does not seem to be describe-able in ordinary physical terms”
...but it must be—everything in the universe is.
Re: “or to arise from theories of the physical world, because these theories don’t have any place for “experience” or “feeling” as seen from the inside”
So what? They don’t have the notion of “fractal drainage patterns” or “screw dislocations” either. Complex systems have emergent properties, not obviously related to physical laws—but still ultimately the product of those laws.
Feelings are patterns—and like all patterns, are made of information.
Is that an observed fact, or a definition of “everything in the universe”?
If a fact, a rule that has held so far, then (some people claim that) consciousness is an observation that contradicts this rule.
If a definition, then perhaps consciousness can also be said to be “in” the universe, but that doesn’t help us understand it...
Anyway, I don’t think I have any more to contribute to this discussion. I fully understand your position. I think I also understand the position of at least some people who claim that consciousness is a real, but extra-physical, thing to be explained (like MItchell_Porter?). So I’ve tried to explain the latter viewpoint.
But I ended up going in circles because this idea rests on everyone agreeing that their subjective experiences indicate that such a “extra-physical consciousness” exists, and the moment someone doesn’t accept this premise—like you—the discussion is pretty much over.
I’m ambivalent myself: I can understand what the “pro-consciousness” people mean, and I might accept their claims if they could answer all the resulting questions, which they don’t. So I see a possible unresolved problem. On the other hand, it’s likely that if I hadn’t encountered this idea of consciousness I would never have come up with it myself, all talk of “immediate subjective knowledge” nonwithstanding. That’s why I’m not sure there is a problem.
Re: “If a fact, a rule that has held so far, then (some people claim that) consciousness is an observation that contradicts this rule.”
Right—but those people have no convincing evidence. If there was some mysterious meta-physical do-dah out there, we should expect to see some evidence. Until there is evidence, the hypothesis is not favoured by Occam’s razor.
The advocates can look for evidence, and the sceptics can think they are crazy—but until some actual evidence is found, there’s not much for people like me to discuss. The hypothesis is about as near to dead as it can get.
As I said: the hypothesis relies entirely on everyone agreeing that they, too, sense this mysterious thing inside them (or identical with them, or whatever).
Until new evidence or argument is brought forward, I’ll continue treating it as a cultural mental artifact. But I do feel somewhat sympathetic towards attempts at creating such new arguments without using new evidence.
Why would a subjective experience cause people to think they know more about physics than physicists do? Subjective experiences are an especially poor quality form of evidence.
Subjective experience is immediate. You can’t ignore or deny its existence (although you may think there’s nothing unexplained or mysterious about it).
When people consider that physics doesn’t explain their subjective experience (whether or not these people fully understand physics), they therefore feel they have no choice but to conclude that the physics, or the physical ontology, is incomplete.
In an computable universe, you can make agents experience literally anything. No amount of zen moments would add up to reasonable evidence.
What would be more convincing is that if brains demonstrably did something that violated the known laws of physics. Much like Penrose thought they did, IOW. Then we would have to poke around in search of what was going on. However, there seems to be no hint of that.
Subjective experience is immediate. You can’t ignore or deny its existence.
Sure you can, if you’re an epiphenomenalist. (Am I right that you’ve been advocating that position, though you may not hold it?) A conscious being could sincerely deny experiencing consciousness. Such a being wouldn’t be a normal human, though possibly a brain-damaged human. At any rate, they surely exist in mind-space. Likewise, an unconscious being could claim to experience consciousness (i.e. a p-zombie).
It would seem that heterophenomenology as ciphergoth has been advocating is incompatible with ephiphenomenalism.
I suspect that there might be some sort of personality disposition to be more or less willing to claim to experience experience, to feel the immediacy of consciousness. Something analogous to the conservative/liberal divide. If that’s true, then making claims like the quoted one is just the mind projection fallacy.
Sure you can, if you’re an epiphenomenalist. (Am I right that you’ve been advocating that position, though you may not hold it?)
Yes, that’s more or less what I’ve been advocating. (The funny thing is that I don’t even have a clear position of my own...)
Regarding consciousness without experience, in what sense is it consciousness then? I’d call it an unconscious but highly intelligent agent—perhaps the AIs we’ll build will be such.
I suspect that there might be some sort of personality disposition to be more or less willing to claim to experience experience, to feel the immediacy of consciousness. Something analogous to the conservative/liberal divide. If that’s true, then making claims like the quoted one is just the mind projection fallacy.
A very good idea, and a possible explanation for many disagreements. It’d be just like the known cases of people disagreeing about whether thinking necessarily involved visual mental images, or whether human thinking necessarily involves “talking to oneself” using sound processing circuitry.
The “experience experience” of those who do report it still has to be explained to their satisfaction. Those who don’t experience it as vividly just tend to shrug it off as not important or not real or a cultural delusion of some sort.
Re: “To deny consciousness as a problem, you need to deny the existence of your own subjective experience.”
That just sounds like nonsense to me :-(
Keeping in mind that I’m explaining a view with which I don’t fully agree (but I don’t hold to an alternative view either, I just don’t fully understand the matter) - I’ll try to reformulate.
We have subjective experience. It does not seem to be describe-able in ordinary physical terms, or to arise from theories of the physical world, because these theories don’t have any place for “experience” or “feeling” as seen from the inside—only as seen from the outside.
What the experience is about, the events and information we experience, is part of the physical world. Aboutness is fully explained as part of the physical world. What’s not explained is why we feel at all. Why does an algorithm feel like something from the inside? Why does it have an “inside”?
I have feelings, experiences, etc. The question being asked isn’t even why I have them. It’s more like, what are they? What ontological kind do they have?
Re: “We have subjective experience. It does not seem to be describe-able in ordinary physical terms”
...but it must be—everything in the universe is.
Re: “or to arise from theories of the physical world, because these theories don’t have any place for “experience” or “feeling” as seen from the inside”
So what? They don’t have the notion of “fractal drainage patterns” or “screw dislocations” either. Complex systems have emergent properties, not obviously related to physical laws—but still ultimately the product of those laws.
Feelings are patterns—and like all patterns, are made of information.
Is that an observed fact, or a definition of “everything in the universe”?
If a fact, a rule that has held so far, then (some people claim that) consciousness is an observation that contradicts this rule.
If a definition, then perhaps consciousness can also be said to be “in” the universe, but that doesn’t help us understand it...
Anyway, I don’t think I have any more to contribute to this discussion. I fully understand your position. I think I also understand the position of at least some people who claim that consciousness is a real, but extra-physical, thing to be explained (like MItchell_Porter?). So I’ve tried to explain the latter viewpoint.
But I ended up going in circles because this idea rests on everyone agreeing that their subjective experiences indicate that such a “extra-physical consciousness” exists, and the moment someone doesn’t accept this premise—like you—the discussion is pretty much over.
I’m ambivalent myself: I can understand what the “pro-consciousness” people mean, and I might accept their claims if they could answer all the resulting questions, which they don’t. So I see a possible unresolved problem. On the other hand, it’s likely that if I hadn’t encountered this idea of consciousness I would never have come up with it myself, all talk of “immediate subjective knowledge” nonwithstanding. That’s why I’m not sure there is a problem.
Re: “If a fact, a rule that has held so far, then (some people claim that) consciousness is an observation that contradicts this rule.”
Right—but those people have no convincing evidence. If there was some mysterious meta-physical do-dah out there, we should expect to see some evidence. Until there is evidence, the hypothesis is not favoured by Occam’s razor.
The advocates can look for evidence, and the sceptics can think they are crazy—but until some actual evidence is found, there’s not much for people like me to discuss. The hypothesis is about as near to dead as it can get.
As I said: the hypothesis relies entirely on everyone agreeing that they, too, sense this mysterious thing inside them (or identical with them, or whatever).
Until new evidence or argument is brought forward, I’ll continue treating it as a cultural mental artifact. But I do feel somewhat sympathetic towards attempts at creating such new arguments without using new evidence.
Why would a subjective experience cause people to think they know more about physics than physicists do? Subjective experiences are an especially poor quality form of evidence.
Subjective experience is immediate. You can’t ignore or deny its existence (although you may think there’s nothing unexplained or mysterious about it).
When people consider that physics doesn’t explain their subjective experience (whether or not these people fully understand physics), they therefore feel they have no choice but to conclude that the physics, or the physical ontology, is incomplete.
In an computable universe, you can make agents experience literally anything. No amount of zen moments would add up to reasonable evidence.
What would be more convincing is that if brains demonstrably did something that violated the known laws of physics. Much like Penrose thought they did, IOW. Then we would have to poke around in search of what was going on. However, there seems to be no hint of that.
Sure you can, if you’re an epiphenomenalist. (Am I right that you’ve been advocating that position, though you may not hold it?) A conscious being could sincerely deny experiencing consciousness. Such a being wouldn’t be a normal human, though possibly a brain-damaged human. At any rate, they surely exist in mind-space. Likewise, an unconscious being could claim to experience consciousness (i.e. a p-zombie).
It would seem that heterophenomenology as ciphergoth has been advocating is incompatible with ephiphenomenalism.
I suspect that there might be some sort of personality disposition to be more or less willing to claim to experience experience, to feel the immediacy of consciousness. Something analogous to the conservative/liberal divide. If that’s true, then making claims like the quoted one is just the mind projection fallacy.
Yes, that’s more or less what I’ve been advocating. (The funny thing is that I don’t even have a clear position of my own...)
Regarding consciousness without experience, in what sense is it consciousness then? I’d call it an unconscious but highly intelligent agent—perhaps the AIs we’ll build will be such.
A very good idea, and a possible explanation for many disagreements. It’d be just like the known cases of people disagreeing about whether thinking necessarily involved visual mental images, or whether human thinking necessarily involves “talking to oneself” using sound processing circuitry.
The “experience experience” of those who do report it still has to be explained to their satisfaction. Those who don’t experience it as vividly just tend to shrug it off as not important or not real or a cultural delusion of some sort.
Perhaps you are a zombie.
This is not the first time that the qualiaphiles have used that put-down on me.
It seems to me that zombie is tongue-in-cheek, while qualiaphile is a calculated rhetorical put-down.