So you demand AGI-level projects be completed before admitting even in principle that conciousness might be a solvable problem?
Do you apply similar standards to evolution by means of natural selection?
Metzinger identifies a plausible set of minimal properties, and justifies that selection on the basis of neurological work and thinking. It’s as much philosophising as reverse engineering “mind” based on failure modes.
So you demand AGI-level projects be completed before admitting even in principle that conciousness might be a solvable problem?
I readily admit it’s solvable, but declaring it solved calls for higher standards. And consciousness isn’t the same as intelligence: a “dreamer” device that just watched a movie (or a bitstring, whatever) without analyzing it would make a perfectly fine demonstration.
It’s a fine, bold title, but I don’t think that many feel that Consciousness Explained actually explains consciousness. What I got from it wasn’t the feeling that there was no work left to do, but that the back of the problem had been broken—that it had been moved from something so hard to think about that it made your brain spin into something that we could apply ordinary reductionistic methods to without getting mired.
So you demand AGI-level projects be completed before admitting even in principle that conciousness might be a solvable problem?
Do you apply similar standards to evolution by means of natural selection?
Metzinger identifies a plausible set of minimal properties, and justifies that selection on the basis of neurological work and thinking. It’s as much philosophising as reverse engineering “mind” based on failure modes.
I readily admit it’s solvable, but declaring it solved calls for higher standards. And consciousness isn’t the same as intelligence: a “dreamer” device that just watched a movie (or a bitstring, whatever) without analyzing it would make a perfectly fine demonstration.
It’s a fine, bold title, but I don’t think that many feel that Consciousness Explained actually explains consciousness. What I got from it wasn’t the feeling that there was no work left to do, but that the back of the problem had been broken—that it had been moved from something so hard to think about that it made your brain spin into something that we could apply ordinary reductionistic methods to without getting mired.