Red herrings may (and black ravens may not) constitute evidence that all ravens are black.
Most of his other points rely on loose definitions, IMO (“rational”, “justified”, “selfish”, “cat”), but this one seems plainly wrong to me, as he seems to attach the same meaning to the word “evidence” as LW does (although not that formal).
I’m not saying philosophers do not contribute to problem-solving, far from it. It may be that he is wrong and this is not “at least as well-established as most scientific results” in philosophy. It may also be that a significant amount of philosophers disregard (or have no knowledge of) Bayesian inference.
I too would generally regard observations of black ravens as being weak evidence that all ravens are black.
Weak evidence, but evidence nonetheless. I read the essay again, and it appears that what the author means is that there exists a case where observing a black raven is not evidence that all ravens are black; the case he specified is one where the raven is picked from a population already known to be consisting of black ravens only. In some sense, he is correct. Then again, this is not a new observation.
He does present a case where observing a red haring constitutes weak probabilistic evidence that all ravens are black.
So, my disagreement comes from my misinterpretation of the word “may”.
Most of his other points rely on loose definitions, IMO (“rational”, “justified”, “selfish”, “cat”), but this one seems plainly wrong to me, as he seems to attach the same meaning to the word “evidence” as LW does (although not that formal).
I’m not saying philosophers do not contribute to problem-solving, far from it. It may be that he is wrong and this is not “at least as well-established as most scientific results” in philosophy. It may also be that a significant amount of philosophers disregard (or have no knowledge of) Bayesian inference.
http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/09/raven-paradox-essay.html
Fair enough, I think. I too would generally regard observations of black ravens as being weak evidence that all ravens are black.
Weak evidence, but evidence nonetheless. I read the essay again, and it appears that what the author means is that there exists a case where observing a black raven is not evidence that all ravens are black; the case he specified is one where the raven is picked from a population already known to be consisting of black ravens only. In some sense, he is correct. Then again, this is not a new observation.
He does present a case where observing a red haring constitutes weak probabilistic evidence that all ravens are black.
So, my disagreement comes from my misinterpretation of the word “may”.