I’m always a little suspicious of this line of thinking. Partly because the terminal/instrumental value division isn’t very clean in humans—since more deeply ingrained values are harder to break regardless of their centrality, and we don’t have very good introspective access to value relationships, it’s remarkably difficult to unambiguously nail down any terminal values in real people. Never mind figuring out where they differ. But more importantly, it’s just too convenient: if you and your political enemies have different fundamental values, you’ve just managed to absolve yourself of any responsibility for argument. That’s not connotationally the same as saying the people you disagree with are all evil mutants or hapless dupes, but it’s functionally pretty damn close.
That doesn’t prove it wrong, of course, but I do think it’s grounds for caution.
How about different factions (landowners, truck drivers, soldiers, immigrants, etc.) all advocating their own interests? Doesn’t that count as “different values”?
Or, more simply, I value myself and my family, you value yourself and your family, so we have dufferent values. Ideologies are just a more general and complicated form.
Well, it depends what you mean by values. I was mainly discussing Randy_M’s comment that rationalism doesn’t dictate terminal values; while different perspectives probably mean the evolution of different value systems even given identical hardwiring, that doesn’t necessarily reflect different terminal values. Those don’t reflect preferences but rather the algorithm by which preferences evolve; and self-interest is one module of that, not seven billion.
No, I think people can be persuaded on terminal values, although to an extent that modifies my response above; rationality will tell you that certain values are more likely to conflict, and noticing internal contradictions—pitting two vales against each other—is one way to convince someone to alter—or just adjust the relative worth of—their terminal values.
Due to the complexity of social reality I don’t think you are going to find too many with beliefs that are perfectly consistent; that is, any mainstream political affiliations is unlikely to be a shinning paragon of coherance and logical progression built upon core principles relative to its competitors.
But demonstrate with examples if I’m wrong.
If you can persuade someone to alter (not merely ignore) a value they believe to have been terminal, that’s good evidence that it wasn’t a terminal value.
This is only true if you think humans actually hold coherent values that are internally designated as “terminal” or “instrumental”. Humans only ever even designate statements as terminal values once you introduce them to the concept.
To clarify, I suspect most neurotypical humans may possess features of ethical development which map reasonably well to the notion of terminal values, although we don’t know their details (if we did, we’d be most of the way to solving ethics) or the extent to which they’re shared. I also believe that almost everyone who professes some particular terminal (fundamental, immutable) value is wrong, as evidenced by the fact that these not infrequently change.
I’m always a little suspicious of this line of thinking. Partly because the terminal/instrumental value division isn’t very clean in humans—since more deeply ingrained values are harder to break regardless of their centrality, and we don’t have very good introspective access to value relationships, it’s remarkably difficult to unambiguously nail down any terminal values in real people. Never mind figuring out where they differ. But more importantly, it’s just too convenient: if you and your political enemies have different fundamental values, you’ve just managed to absolve yourself of any responsibility for argument. That’s not connotationally the same as saying the people you disagree with are all evil mutants or hapless dupes, but it’s functionally pretty damn close.
That doesn’t prove it wrong, of course, but I do think it’s grounds for caution.
How about different factions (landowners, truck drivers, soldiers, immigrants, etc.) all advocating their own interests? Doesn’t that count as “different values”?
Or, more simply, I value myself and my family, you value yourself and your family, so we have dufferent values. Ideologies are just a more general and complicated form.
Well, it depends what you mean by values. I was mainly discussing Randy_M’s comment that rationalism doesn’t dictate terminal values; while different perspectives probably mean the evolution of different value systems even given identical hardwiring, that doesn’t necessarily reflect different terminal values. Those don’t reflect preferences but rather the algorithm by which preferences evolve; and self-interest is one module of that, not seven billion.
No, I think people can be persuaded on terminal values, although to an extent that modifies my response above; rationality will tell you that certain values are more likely to conflict, and noticing internal contradictions—pitting two vales against each other—is one way to convince someone to alter—or just adjust the relative worth of—their terminal values. Due to the complexity of social reality I don’t think you are going to find too many with beliefs that are perfectly consistent; that is, any mainstream political affiliations is unlikely to be a shinning paragon of coherance and logical progression built upon core principles relative to its competitors. But demonstrate with examples if I’m wrong.
If you can persuade someone to alter (not merely ignore) a value they believe to have been terminal, that’s good evidence that it wasn’t a terminal value.
This is only true if you think humans actually hold coherent values that are internally designated as “terminal” or “instrumental”. Humans only ever even designate statements as terminal values once you introduce them to the concept.
I don’t think we disagree.
To clarify, I suspect most neurotypical humans may possess features of ethical development which map reasonably well to the notion of terminal values, although we don’t know their details (if we did, we’d be most of the way to solving ethics) or the extent to which they’re shared. I also believe that almost everyone who professes some particular terminal (fundamental, immutable) value is wrong, as evidenced by the fact that these not infrequently change.
If terminal values are definitionally immutable, than I used the wrong term.