I disagree. From the altruistic perspective these puzzles are fully co-operative co-ordination games with two equally good types of Nash equilibria (everyone chooses red, or at least half choose blue), where the strategy you should play depends on which equilibrium you decide to aim for. Players have to try to co-ordinate on choosing the same one, so it’s just a classic case of Schelling point selection, and the framing will affect what the Schelling point is (assuming everyone gets told the same framing).
(What’s really fun is that we now have two different framings to the meta-problem of “When different framings give different intuitions, should you let the framing influence your decision?” and they give different intuitions.)
I disagree. From the altruistic perspective these puzzles are fully co-operative co-ordination games with two equally good types of Nash equilibria (everyone chooses red, or at least half choose blue), where the strategy you should play depends on which equilibrium you decide to aim for. Players have to try to co-ordinate on choosing the same one, so it’s just a classic case of Schelling point selection, and the framing will affect what the Schelling point is (assuming everyone gets told the same framing).
(What’s really fun is that we now have two different framings to the meta-problem of “When different framings give different intuitions, should you let the framing influence your decision?” and they give different intuitions.)