Did it a few days ago, only just noticed the karma.
EDIT:
P(Supernatural)
What is the probability that supernatural events, defined as those involving ontologically basic mental entities, have occurred since the beginning of the universe?
What if you believed in, say, angels or ghosts that used powers from outside the matrix?
What if you believed in, say, angels or ghosts that used powers from outside the matrix?
I assumed that those aren’t counted. They don’t sound really ontologically basic, just “hard to access”. We can-in-principle break outside the box, and we are-in-principle causally linked to outside-the-matrix powers, or something like that.
That’s my point. They aren’t ontologically basic, yet most people would consider them “supernatural” for all intents and purposes. At least, I would. The definition of “supernatural” offered is deliberately incoherent, which is great for winning arguments but bad for making predictions.
Wait, could you explain (or taboo, if that’s easier) what you mean by “incoherent”? I don’t see what’s incoherent about “event which happened because a nonreducible basic element of the building blocks of the universe has complex causal influence on the universe using complex internal rules”. Is that the wrong way to interpret “events involving ontologically basic mental entities”?
By far the best definition I’ve ever heard of the supernatural is Richard Carrier’s: A “supernatural” explanation appeals to ontologically basic mental things, mental entities that cannot be reduced to nonmental entities.
This is the difference, for example, between saying that water rolls downhill because it wants to be lower, and setting forth differential equations that claim to describe only motions, not desires. It’s the difference between saying that a tree puts forth leaves because of a tree spirit, versus examining plant biochemistry. Cognitive science takes the fight against supernaturalism into the realm of the mind.
Why is this an excellent definition of the supernatural? I refer you to Richard Carrier for the full argument. But consider: Suppose that you discover what seems to be a spirit, inhabiting a tree: a dryad who can materialize outside or inside the tree, who speaks in English about the need to protect her tree, et cetera. And then suppose that we turn a microscope on this tree spirit, and she turns out to be made of parts—not inherently spiritual and ineffable parts, like fabric of desireness and cloth of belief; but rather the same sort of parts as quarks and electrons, parts whose behavior is defined in motions rather than minds. Wouldn’t the dryad immediately be demoted to the dull catalogue of common things?
I’m not sure I agree with the statements that say “this is incoherent a priori”, but I haven’t explored the question in depth yet. It seems as if one could envision a universe where a certain specific quark (or replace with whatever most-elementary thing turns out to really be most elementary, if any) does unpredictable things and interacts with other selected quarks in the universe in specific ways that maximize the odds of a certain specific event happening later on, “as if” this quark had the intent of making this event happen.
Would this not be a mental entity that cannot be reduced? Perhaps this is exactly the kind of “confusion” Eliezer was talking about.
In general, the local definition of “supernatural entity” excludes all manner of extremely powerful, unverifiable-in-practice, non-evidence-leaving entities (e.g., beings from outside the matrix).
The rough principle is that believing in such non-supernatural powerful unverifiable entities is problematic for one set of reasons (the phrase “invisible dragon” is sometimes used as shorthand for this, after Carl Sagan’s famous essay; see also Belief in Belief), and believing in ontologically basic mental entities is problematic for a different set of reasons (cf Excluding the Supernatural, quoting Richard Carrier).
(I will also add here, since it has lately become a socially relevant thing here, that I’m not trying to suggest by crediting the original authors that the Sequence posts don’t add anything novel to the discussion.)
I suppose my problem is that we can’t indicate our opinion on such beings, which, unlike the definition used, are not incoherent and indeed I suspect more people here would admit to some non-negligible probability of such beings than the “supernatural” ones described in the census.
It’s not a huge problem, it just seems that the normal definition is more relevant than the one used.
So, you’d want to see a question like “Estimate the probability that there exist non-supernatural in-practice-unverifiable entities who are currently aware of and capable of influencing events on Earth.”?
I agree with you that more people would estimate that higher than the probability of supernatural entites.
As for whether it’s more relevant… hm. Relevant to what? That is, suppose that the mean reported probability were 10%. Or suppose it were 75%. Or .001%. What would you do with those answers?
I wouldn’t restrict it to non-supernatural entities, because that might cause people to give their estimate that aliens have reached us, rather than considering, say, matrix lords or demons.
I think my question still applies. For example, consider two worlds in which that question were asked, one in which the mean reported probability were 10%, the other 75%. What information would you have about the difference between those two worlds, and why do you want that information?
Because if someone believes in ghosts, I could really care less if they believe they’re irreducibly mental. I want to know what they’ll do when their pipes start knocking more than their philosophical justification for this, although obviously both would be best.
Did it a few days ago, only just noticed the karma.
EDIT:
What if you believed in, say, angels or ghosts that used powers from outside the matrix?
I assumed that those aren’t counted. They don’t sound really ontologically basic, just “hard to access”. We can-in-principle break outside the box, and we are-in-principle causally linked to outside-the-matrix powers, or something like that.
That’s my point. They aren’t ontologically basic, yet most people would consider them “supernatural” for all intents and purposes. At least, I would. The definition of “supernatural” offered is deliberately incoherent, which is great for winning arguments but bad for making predictions.
Wait, could you explain (or taboo, if that’s easier) what you mean by “incoherent”? I don’t see what’s incoherent about “event which happened because a nonreducible basic element of the building blocks of the universe has complex causal influence on the universe using complex internal rules”. Is that the wrong way to interpret “events involving ontologically basic mental entities”?
Does this help?
-Eliezer Yudkowsky, Excluding the supernatural
Well, re-reading the whole post did help a bit.
I’m not sure I agree with the statements that say “this is incoherent a priori”, but I haven’t explored the question in depth yet. It seems as if one could envision a universe where a certain specific quark (or replace with whatever most-elementary thing turns out to really be most elementary, if any) does unpredictable things and interacts with other selected quarks in the universe in specific ways that maximize the odds of a certain specific event happening later on, “as if” this quark had the intent of making this event happen.
Would this not be a mental entity that cannot be reduced? Perhaps this is exactly the kind of “confusion” Eliezer was talking about.
I think it would have to be conscious? Maybe? Hmm, that is confusing...
In general, the local definition of “supernatural entity” excludes all manner of extremely powerful, unverifiable-in-practice, non-evidence-leaving entities (e.g., beings from outside the matrix).
The rough principle is that believing in such non-supernatural powerful unverifiable entities is problematic for one set of reasons (the phrase “invisible dragon” is sometimes used as shorthand for this, after Carl Sagan’s famous essay; see also Belief in Belief), and believing in ontologically basic mental entities is problematic for a different set of reasons (cf Excluding the Supernatural, quoting Richard Carrier).
(I will also add here, since it has lately become a socially relevant thing here, that I’m not trying to suggest by crediting the original authors that the Sequence posts don’t add anything novel to the discussion.)
I suppose my problem is that we can’t indicate our opinion on such beings, which, unlike the definition used, are not incoherent and indeed I suspect more people here would admit to some non-negligible probability of such beings than the “supernatural” ones described in the census.
It’s not a huge problem, it just seems that the normal definition is more relevant than the one used.
So, you’d want to see a question like “Estimate the probability that there exist non-supernatural in-practice-unverifiable entities who are currently aware of and capable of influencing events on Earth.”?
I agree with you that more people would estimate that higher than the probability of supernatural entites.
As for whether it’s more relevant… hm. Relevant to what? That is, suppose that the mean reported probability were 10%. Or suppose it were 75%. Or .001%. What would you do with those answers?
Perhaps “informative” would be a better term.
I wouldn’t restrict it to non-supernatural entities, because that might cause people to give their estimate that aliens have reached us, rather than considering, say, matrix lords or demons.
I think my question still applies. For example, consider two worlds in which that question were asked, one in which the mean reported probability were 10%, the other 75%. What information would you have about the difference between those two worlds, and why do you want that information?
Because if someone believes in ghosts, I could really care less if they believe they’re irreducibly mental. I want to know what they’ll do when their pipes start knocking more than their philosophical justification for this, although obviously both would be best.
(nods) Makes sense.