So, having now reread Stuart’s linked post, I’ll say that for me the issue is not well resolved. It still assumes the presence of normative assumptions and even choose some specific normative assumptions to make about how to resolve conflicts (although we could argue that the source of these is vague enough that they aren’t fully the sort of normative assumptions we’d ultimately make and more proto-assumptions).
I’ll also say I got a bit mixed up when I wrote this post and would now back off the argument that alignment seems to require moral facts. I think instead it only requires normative assumptions, which is still a problem from the same reason by at least separates it from the philosophical problem of moral facts even if it leaves most of the practical problem of picking norms.
So, having now reread Stuart’s linked post, I’ll say that for me the issue is not well resolved. It still assumes the presence of normative assumptions and even choose some specific normative assumptions to make about how to resolve conflicts (although we could argue that the source of these is vague enough that they aren’t fully the sort of normative assumptions we’d ultimately make and more proto-assumptions).
I’ll also say I got a bit mixed up when I wrote this post and would now back off the argument that alignment seems to require moral facts. I think instead it only requires normative assumptions, which is still a problem from the same reason by at least separates it from the philosophical problem of moral facts even if it leaves most of the practical problem of picking norms.