Is that argument related to saying that animals are p-zombies?
It isn’t saying that animals have no qualia, but I think it’s saying that some types of qualia matter more than others, and that animals can behave like people in terms of reacting to and avoiding pain, but the behavior means something very different from what it would if a person were doing it.
Is that argument related to saying that animals are p-zombies?
It’s related in that it is intended to set the stage to show that dualism is true, if only for humans—and specifically that it is true only for humans. (In the case of p-zombies, the assertion that p-zombies are conceivable as an actually possible thing is an assertion that dualism is conceivable as an actually possible thing, so it’s no surprise the argument concludes by proving dualism, i.e. something it assumed.)
I’d say that if qualia actually exist in some sense, and animals (at least those that are somewhat related to humans, e.g. mice and other mammals) have qualia, then awareness of pain is most likely among them. I’d also assume that all animals with qualia have some assessment of “pleasing” and “suffering”, because conscious awareness would not be evolutionarily useful otherwise. Craig is probably assuming that animals do not have qualia, although he does not state this assumption clearly.
Is that argument related to saying that animals are p-zombies?
It isn’t saying that animals have no qualia, but I think it’s saying that some types of qualia matter more than others, and that animals can behave like people in terms of reacting to and avoiding pain, but the behavior means something very different from what it would if a person were doing it.
It’s related in that it is intended to set the stage to show that dualism is true, if only for humans—and specifically that it is true only for humans. (In the case of p-zombies, the assertion that p-zombies are conceivable as an actually possible thing is an assertion that dualism is conceivable as an actually possible thing, so it’s no surprise the argument concludes by proving dualism, i.e. something it assumed.)
I’d say that if qualia actually exist in some sense, and animals (at least those that are somewhat related to humans, e.g. mice and other mammals) have qualia, then awareness of pain is most likely among them. I’d also assume that all animals with qualia have some assessment of “pleasing” and “suffering”, because conscious awareness would not be evolutionarily useful otherwise. Craig is probably assuming that animals do not have qualia, although he does not state this assumption clearly.