Citation needed for most claims, but the core distinction between avoidance, pain, and awareness of pain works. Systems that have negative reinforcement pathways exist even if not all invertebrates are examples. David Gerard points out that neurological similarities make animals almost certainly aware of their pain, but there can be (we could create) exceptions.
But why on Earth would we care about awareness of pain rather than just plain pain?
Years after that, I was in a similar situation and eventually asked a friend why my body kept acting like it was in pain. She responded that my body was in fact in pain, and that the reason I didn’t understand my own reactions was the dissociation that goes with severe chronic pain. And that nobody who wasn’t in pain would ask that question.
From reading Baggs’ post, it seems that she is only complaining about the side-effects of her pain-like reflexes, not about the reflexes or the “pain” itself. To the extent that animals have no self-awareness of pain, this would in fact support Craig’s argument. And yes, if we could only partially relieve these reactions by increasing her awareness of them, that would be bad. Of course, there are in fact ways to mitigate one’s self awareness of pain, such as meditation.
Would this imply that if meditation can lower enough level 3 pain to level 2, then meditators should count as less human? That people should have less concern about causing pain to skilled meditators?
Not sure where the “less human” part is coming from here. Should folks who can buy Aspirin and Tylenol (or even strong narcotic painkillers) at the local drugstore count as “less human” than folks who can’t? Perhaps we should care less about them feeling pain, but the effect seems quite negligible. Also, my guess is that some animals at least do have awareness of pain, contra Craig; so using “human” here is very misleading.
If an important distinction between people and animals is that animals only take pain up to 2, then a human who perceives pain only (mostly?) at the 2 level might be more like an animal.
Analgesics aren’t relevant to this argument because they eliminate or blunt pain rather than changing the experience of it.
If an important distinction between people and animals is that animals only take pain up to 2, then a human who perceives pain only (mostly?) at the 2 level might be more like an animal.
In terms of experiencing pain, yes (although I do think there are more level 3 animals than Craig does). If I had to choose between torturing a level 2 human or a level 3 human I’d pick a level 2, providing the torture did no lasting damage to the body.
However, a far, far more morally significant distinction between a human and an animal is that humans can foresee the future and have preferences about how it turns out. I think an important part of morality is respecting these preferences, regardless of whether they involve pleasure or pain. So it is still wrong to kill or otherwise inconvenience a level 2 human, because they have many preferences about what they want to accomplish in life, and thwarting such preferences is just as bad, if not worse, then inflicting pain upon them.
It would even be fine to inflict small amounts of pain on a level 3 human if doing so will prevent a major life-goal of a level 2 human from being thwarted.
EDIT: Of course, I’m not saying that no other animals possess the ability to have preferences about the future. I’m sure a few do. But there are a great many that don’t and I think that is an important distinction.
Citation needed for most claims, but the core distinction between avoidance, pain, and awareness of pain works. Systems that have negative reinforcement pathways exist even if not all invertebrates are examples. David Gerard points out that neurological similarities make animals almost certainly aware of their pain, but there can be (we could create) exceptions.
But why on Earth would we care about awareness of pain rather than just plain pain?
Amanda Baggs, The Summer Thing
Craig’s argument implies that if we partially relieved Amanda’s pain, if would be bad, because she’d be aware of her pain. That doesn’t sound right.
From reading Baggs’ post, it seems that she is only complaining about the side-effects of her pain-like reflexes, not about the reflexes or the “pain” itself. To the extent that animals have no self-awareness of pain, this would in fact support Craig’s argument. And yes, if we could only partially relieve these reactions by increasing her awareness of them, that would be bad. Of course, there are in fact ways to mitigate one’s self awareness of pain, such as meditation.
Would this imply that if meditation can lower enough level 3 pain to level 2, then meditators should count as less human? That people should have less concern about causing pain to skilled meditators?
Not sure where the “less human” part is coming from here. Should folks who can buy Aspirin and Tylenol (or even strong narcotic painkillers) at the local drugstore count as “less human” than folks who can’t? Perhaps we should care less about them feeling pain, but the effect seems quite negligible. Also, my guess is that some animals at least do have awareness of pain, contra Craig; so using “human” here is very misleading.
If an important distinction between people and animals is that animals only take pain up to 2, then a human who perceives pain only (mostly?) at the 2 level might be more like an animal.
Analgesics aren’t relevant to this argument because they eliminate or blunt pain rather than changing the experience of it.
In terms of experiencing pain, yes (although I do think there are more level 3 animals than Craig does). If I had to choose between torturing a level 2 human or a level 3 human I’d pick a level 2, providing the torture did no lasting damage to the body.
However, a far, far more morally significant distinction between a human and an animal is that humans can foresee the future and have preferences about how it turns out. I think an important part of morality is respecting these preferences, regardless of whether they involve pleasure or pain. So it is still wrong to kill or otherwise inconvenience a level 2 human, because they have many preferences about what they want to accomplish in life, and thwarting such preferences is just as bad, if not worse, then inflicting pain upon them.
It would even be fine to inflict small amounts of pain on a level 3 human if doing so will prevent a major life-goal of a level 2 human from being thwarted.
EDIT: Of course, I’m not saying that no other animals possess the ability to have preferences about the future. I’m sure a few do. But there are a great many that don’t and I think that is an important distinction.