I got in a discussion with a philosophy grad student today, who told me that the question of whether thoughts were “just” patterns of neural flashes, or if there was something epiphenomenal going on, was still a serious open question. I’m really hoping that this is just a description of the current state of affairs in the philosophy world, and not the neuroscience world, but she seemed rather insistent on this point. This isn’t actually considered an open question in neurobiology, right?
This isn’t actually considered an open question in neurobiology, right?
It isn’t a question in neurobiology at all. If consciousness is epiphenomenal, then by definition you can’t perform any experiment to detect its existence. And insofar as neurology is the attempt to discover the material composition of the brain and the causal structure of brain events, and epiphenomenalism holds that consciousness is immaterial and causally silent, well...
I think the question here is not “is this an open question” but “are there people who disbelieve this?”. I can imagine neurobiologists who cannot rule out epiphenomena about thoughts.
Neuroscientists generally assume that all mental processes have a concrete neurobiological basis.
Searching for something similar in Google Scholar might give you lots of sources to suggest to the grad student that most neuroscientists are reductionists.
I got in a discussion with a philosophy grad student today, who told me that the question of whether thoughts were “just” patterns of neural flashes, or if there was something epiphenomenal going on, was still a serious open question. I’m really hoping that this is just a description of the current state of affairs in the philosophy world, and not the neuroscience world, but she seemed rather insistent on this point. This isn’t actually considered an open question in neurobiology, right?
It isn’t a question in neurobiology at all. If consciousness is epiphenomenal, then by definition you can’t perform any experiment to detect its existence. And insofar as neurology is the attempt to discover the material composition of the brain and the causal structure of brain events, and epiphenomenalism holds that consciousness is immaterial and causally silent, well...
I made that mistake once too.
Uh huh.
No. It’s crazy talk.
Tautology.
I think the question here is not “is this an open question” but “are there people who disbelieve this?”. I can imagine neurobiologists who cannot rule out epiphenomena about thoughts.
True, I can imagine that as well. I guess my question was really more about prevalence. How common are these people?
I came across this in an unrelated discussion:
Searching for something similar in Google Scholar might give you lots of sources to suggest to the grad student that most neuroscientists are reductionists.
This is vague enough to not be at all inconsistent with epiphenomenalism.