Once it’s shown conclusively to work no one will want it anymore :)
I don’t get the joke or reference, and it sounds intriguing. Does it mean that if people can be revived successfully into indefinite lifespans, then there would be no need to freeze people going forward?
My big problem with indefinite lifespans is that I think we’re already a warped society by having so many old people (meaning, say older than me at 57 :-)). I suppose if we could first keep everyone from aging and retaining their 25-year-old physiques and energy and mental status, that would address that to some extent. But if we get a world full of reasonably spry 80-year-olds, it doesn’t appeal to me. In my book of values, all else being equal, society is supposed to be half children.
Thought experiment: Suppose we suddenly developed the technology to revive everyone who has ever lived (they left some sort of holographic signal that Google finds it can read :-)). Would we want to? Historians would be overjoyed to revive selected ones because they would help us understand the past. But as a matter of restoring them for their own sake?
As a newcomer I’m sure these have been discussed over and over, and pointers to the relevant discussions are welcome in place of rehashing old arguments.
Thought experiment: Suppose we suddenly developed the technology to revive everyone who has ever lived (they left some sort of holographic signal that Google finds it can read :-)). Would we want to?
Yes. It is not a hard question. As a matter of funding priorities, it would come after being able to reliably feed (and otherwise care for) everyone currently living, but the ultimate answer is: yes, revive them if we can.
The essay you link is pretty unconvincing to me. But even if I grant what Eliezer says there, I’m not sure how it applies to Bart’s thought experiment. I can see the argument that the indefinite extension of human lifespans is just a natural extension of uncontroversial humanism (even though I disagree with the argument). We’d all agree that it would be a good thing to extend lifespans by 10 years, so why not 500 or a a million? A good ethical theory shouldn’t build in arbitrary thresholds.
I don’t see the analogous argument for Bart’s thought experiment. Why is reviving people who are already dead (many of whom have been dead for long enough that they do not have any living acquaintances who mourn their passing) a natural extension of humanism? Could you explain why you think Eliezer’s essay is relevant to Bart’s question?
If you value life over death, then choosing to leave people dead when you could restore their life seems like an exception to me.
(many of whom have been dead for long enough that they do not have any living acquaintances who mourn their passing)
If we revive only those who are mourned by the currently living, those newly currently living people we just revived will mourn others. After some amount of iterations, we will have revived everybody.
I think it is a hard question. The foundations of our societies would all be shaken to the core by the sudden resuscitation that doubles the earth population (even assuming as we must that we can feed them all). I don’t think “save or prolong any life of reasonable quality” scales up past a certain point. At a certain point the psychological quality of life of living individuals that comes from living in a society with a certain structure and values may trump the right of individuals who thought they were dead to live once more. (Humor: If you’ve been widowed three times, do you really want 3 formerly late husbands showing up at your doorstep? :-))
At a certain point the psychological quality of life of living individuals that comes from living in a society with a certain structure and values may trump the right of individuals who thought they were dead to live once more.
This is vague. Can you pinpoint exactly why you think this would damage people’s psychological quality of life?
Yes, it was vague. I’ll try to be more precise—as much as I can.
Suppose we do a pilot experiment in a small region on the Tigris and Euphrates where people have been living in high population densities for a long time. We have large numbers of people coming back from the dead, perhaps 10 times the current population? Perhaps with infant mortality we have 5 times as many children as adults—lots of infants and young children.
But the UN is ready, prepared in advance. There is land for everyone. We figure at least that the dead have lost the right to their property, so we put them all up in modular housing we make outside the present city.
But there are so many formerly dead, from older linguistic and cultural and religious groups, that they form their own political parties and take over the government.
I could go on, but it’s apparent to me that the social order is completely messed up. Now suppose I’m an Egyptian, and it comes to a vote: Do we want to implement this program in Egypt? Assuming that the as-yet-unresurrected dead don’t get a vote, I can see the proposal being voted down overwhelmingly.
My moral intuition is that the Egyptians have no moral obligation to resurrect their ancestors. They have a right to continue their ways of existence.
Of course, this is an extreme thought experiment, and arguing about details won’t be productive.
I have a similar intuition about, say unrestricted immigration. If someone said that utility would be maximized if anyone could move anywhere on earth they wanted, I have an intuition that I as an American have a right to resist that. The status quo has some weight.
Applying rationality to problems can go too far. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a lot of very smart, very thoughtful, very knowledgeable people thought Communism was going to be a great idea. But due to a few slip-ups and miscalculations, it turned out it wasn’t—which we can see with hindsight. No, they didn’t have modern notions of rationalism, but they had the best thinking of their day.
A truism is that if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It’s easier to compute utility on the level of individuals. You can spin a story based on that about what society should look like, but I think you might be biased by the fact that your tool can apply. If the alternative is, “My tools don’t have anything to say on that issue because of complex interactions among people and the entire fabric of society”, then you would be biased to reject that alternative.
I know this brings up a lot of issues, some of which should be considered separately. And I am ignorant of a lot of LW work. Pointers to other work welcome.
If bringing back everyone at once is likely to be overwhelming, it would still be good to bring back, and assimilate into modern culture, a generation at a time.
So, the working assumption is that the future society with mass-resurrection magitech is still running on democracy? In that case, yeah, makes sense to hold off a bit. Say, long enough that the born-after-the-present people who retain our values outnumber the previously-dead. Still seems kinda slapdash, though.
I think your intuition is leading you astray. If we had enough resources to feed and care for everyone who ever lived, we’d be able to scale up. Colonize the solar system, or the galaxy.
And if I had three dead wives, I’d predict that I’d like them all back. I’d expect they’d get along.
I suppose that there’s pretty strong evidence that most people select for things other than friendship/compatibility when choosing life partners. That seems self-evidently stupid to me—there’s a reason why not all flings should turn into life partnerships.
Does it mean that if people can be revived successfully into indefinite lifespans, then there would be no need to freeze people going forward?
Why would there be? Once you have the technology to bring people back from the dead, why freeze and unfreeze them first?
I’m pretty uncertain about my morality, but I do think I would prefer more happy lives all else equal, even if that means lots of old folks and few young folks. Not sure I would prefer reviving the holograms to people just having kids though.
As a newcomer I’m sure these have been discussed over and over, and pointers to the relevant discussions are welcome in place of rehashing old arguments.
I don’t remember any discussion along quite these lines. I think you’re good.
Once it’s shown conclusively to work no one will want it anymore :)
My impression is that cryonics advocates actually get pretty excited thinking about universal cryonics. See http://lesswrong.com/lw/2fd/a_proposal_for_a_cryogenic_grave_for_cryonics/
I don’t get the joke or reference, and it sounds intriguing. Does it mean that if people can be revived successfully into indefinite lifespans, then there would be no need to freeze people going forward?
My big problem with indefinite lifespans is that I think we’re already a warped society by having so many old people (meaning, say older than me at 57 :-)). I suppose if we could first keep everyone from aging and retaining their 25-year-old physiques and energy and mental status, that would address that to some extent. But if we get a world full of reasonably spry 80-year-olds, it doesn’t appeal to me. In my book of values, all else being equal, society is supposed to be half children.
Thought experiment: Suppose we suddenly developed the technology to revive everyone who has ever lived (they left some sort of holographic signal that Google finds it can read :-)). Would we want to? Historians would be overjoyed to revive selected ones because they would help us understand the past. But as a matter of restoring them for their own sake?
As a newcomer I’m sure these have been discussed over and over, and pointers to the relevant discussions are welcome in place of rehashing old arguments.
Yes. It is not a hard question. As a matter of funding priorities, it would come after being able to reliably feed (and otherwise care for) everyone currently living, but the ultimate answer is: yes, revive them if we can.
The essay you link is pretty unconvincing to me. But even if I grant what Eliezer says there, I’m not sure how it applies to Bart’s thought experiment. I can see the argument that the indefinite extension of human lifespans is just a natural extension of uncontroversial humanism (even though I disagree with the argument). We’d all agree that it would be a good thing to extend lifespans by 10 years, so why not 500 or a a million? A good ethical theory shouldn’t build in arbitrary thresholds.
I don’t see the analogous argument for Bart’s thought experiment. Why is reviving people who are already dead (many of whom have been dead for long enough that they do not have any living acquaintances who mourn their passing) a natural extension of humanism? Could you explain why you think Eliezer’s essay is relevant to Bart’s question?
If you value life over death, then choosing to leave people dead when you could restore their life seems like an exception to me.
If we revive only those who are mourned by the currently living, those newly currently living people we just revived will mourn others. After some amount of iterations, we will have revived everybody.
I think it is a hard question. The foundations of our societies would all be shaken to the core by the sudden resuscitation that doubles the earth population (even assuming as we must that we can feed them all). I don’t think “save or prolong any life of reasonable quality” scales up past a certain point. At a certain point the psychological quality of life of living individuals that comes from living in a society with a certain structure and values may trump the right of individuals who thought they were dead to live once more. (Humor: If you’ve been widowed three times, do you really want 3 formerly late husbands showing up at your doorstep? :-))
This is vague. Can you pinpoint exactly why you think this would damage people’s psychological quality of life?
Yes, it was vague. I’ll try to be more precise—as much as I can.
Suppose we do a pilot experiment in a small region on the Tigris and Euphrates where people have been living in high population densities for a long time. We have large numbers of people coming back from the dead, perhaps 10 times the current population? Perhaps with infant mortality we have 5 times as many children as adults—lots of infants and young children.
But the UN is ready, prepared in advance. There is land for everyone. We figure at least that the dead have lost the right to their property, so we put them all up in modular housing we make outside the present city.
But there are so many formerly dead, from older linguistic and cultural and religious groups, that they form their own political parties and take over the government.
I could go on, but it’s apparent to me that the social order is completely messed up. Now suppose I’m an Egyptian, and it comes to a vote: Do we want to implement this program in Egypt? Assuming that the as-yet-unresurrected dead don’t get a vote, I can see the proposal being voted down overwhelmingly.
My moral intuition is that the Egyptians have no moral obligation to resurrect their ancestors. They have a right to continue their ways of existence.
Of course, this is an extreme thought experiment, and arguing about details won’t be productive.
I have a similar intuition about, say unrestricted immigration. If someone said that utility would be maximized if anyone could move anywhere on earth they wanted, I have an intuition that I as an American have a right to resist that. The status quo has some weight.
Applying rationality to problems can go too far. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a lot of very smart, very thoughtful, very knowledgeable people thought Communism was going to be a great idea. But due to a few slip-ups and miscalculations, it turned out it wasn’t—which we can see with hindsight. No, they didn’t have modern notions of rationalism, but they had the best thinking of their day.
A truism is that if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It’s easier to compute utility on the level of individuals. You can spin a story based on that about what society should look like, but I think you might be biased by the fact that your tool can apply. If the alternative is, “My tools don’t have anything to say on that issue because of complex interactions among people and the entire fabric of society”, then you would be biased to reject that alternative.
I know this brings up a lot of issues, some of which should be considered separately. And I am ignorant of a lot of LW work. Pointers to other work welcome.
If bringing back everyone at once is likely to be overwhelming, it would still be good to bring back, and assimilate into modern culture, a generation at a time.
So, the working assumption is that the future society with mass-resurrection magitech is still running on democracy? In that case, yeah, makes sense to hold off a bit. Say, long enough that the born-after-the-present people who retain our values outnumber the previously-dead. Still seems kinda slapdash, though.
I think your intuition is leading you astray. If we had enough resources to feed and care for everyone who ever lived, we’d be able to scale up. Colonize the solar system, or the galaxy.
And if I had three dead wives, I’d predict that I’d like them all back. I’d expect they’d get along.
I’d expect they wouldn’t. Especially if they knew each other in life. “You married HER? I always knew you two had a thing!”
I suppose that there’s pretty strong evidence that most people select for things other than friendship/compatibility when choosing life partners. That seems self-evidently stupid to me—there’s a reason why not all flings should turn into life partnerships.
If so, you’re very lucky. It’s also important to consider more usual cases.
Some people are going to be awfully bent out of shape here. Most likely better than being dead, but they’re going to have needs.
Why would there be? Once you have the technology to bring people back from the dead, why freeze and unfreeze them first?
I’m pretty uncertain about my morality, but I do think I would prefer more happy lives all else equal, even if that means lots of old folks and few young folks. Not sure I would prefer reviving the holograms to people just having kids though.
I don’t remember any discussion along quite these lines. I think you’re good.