I don’t think this is entirely fair to the point buybuydandavis was making. By “making a fetish of epistemic truth,” I don’t think he meant not caring about truth at all, but not putting it above everything else. In reality, everyone cares about truth, but they also care about other things. And that means that our actions are going to be affected by our concern about truth, but they will also be affected by our concerns about other things.
This includes actions like making statements. And no one is exempt from this, because everyone cares about more than one thing. If someone says they care only about truth and nothing else, it is untrue, and in fact is an example of its own untruth, because the person who makes this untrue claim must be motivated by something other than truth in making the claim.
I care a lot about truth, and more than most people do, as far as I can see. But that does not mean that I don’t care about other things. I do, and those other motives can and do affect my statements and beliefs, even if I try to minimize those effects. Certainly I would be unwilling to adopt a false worldview for the sake of other motives. But if someone else cares a bit less about truth than I do, and a bit more about other things, and consequently accept a false worldview for the sake of those other things, I am not horrified by that, even if I would be unwilling to do it myself. In that sense I find the statement by buybuydandavis’s friend understandable.
In a similar way, “truth is only a matter of strategy” is probably not entirely true of anyone. But everyone is going to have their statements affected by their other motives to some degree, and in that sense I am suspicious of everyone’s statements, including my own, much in the way you say here.
I don’t think he meant not caring about truth at all
Sure. Neither, in fact, do I. But let’s be clear: the question was never just “should we care about truth more than everything else?” but “should we care about truth more than anything else when deciding what to believe?” and I think answering no is much more reasonable in the first case than the second. Prioritizing truth when deciding what to believe is no more “fetishizing” than prioritizing minimal aberration when having eyeglasses made, or prioritizing drinkability when arranging your town’s water supply. You may pay some attention to price or aesthetics, but you’d generally be crazy to get lenses that don’t actually do a reasonable job of correcting your vision or drinking water that will poison you.
I don’t think this is entirely fair to the point buybuydandavis was making. By “making a fetish of epistemic truth,” I don’t think he meant not caring about truth at all, but not putting it above everything else. In reality, everyone cares about truth, but they also care about other things. And that means that our actions are going to be affected by our concern about truth, but they will also be affected by our concerns about other things.
This includes actions like making statements. And no one is exempt from this, because everyone cares about more than one thing. If someone says they care only about truth and nothing else, it is untrue, and in fact is an example of its own untruth, because the person who makes this untrue claim must be motivated by something other than truth in making the claim.
I care a lot about truth, and more than most people do, as far as I can see. But that does not mean that I don’t care about other things. I do, and those other motives can and do affect my statements and beliefs, even if I try to minimize those effects. Certainly I would be unwilling to adopt a false worldview for the sake of other motives. But if someone else cares a bit less about truth than I do, and a bit more about other things, and consequently accept a false worldview for the sake of those other things, I am not horrified by that, even if I would be unwilling to do it myself. In that sense I find the statement by buybuydandavis’s friend understandable.
In a similar way, “truth is only a matter of strategy” is probably not entirely true of anyone. But everyone is going to have their statements affected by their other motives to some degree, and in that sense I am suspicious of everyone’s statements, including my own, much in the way you say here.
Winner.
Sure. Neither, in fact, do I. But let’s be clear: the question was never just “should we care about truth more than everything else?” but “should we care about truth more than anything else when deciding what to believe?” and I think answering no is much more reasonable in the first case than the second. Prioritizing truth when deciding what to believe is no more “fetishizing” than prioritizing minimal aberration when having eyeglasses made, or prioritizing drinkability when arranging your town’s water supply. You may pay some attention to price or aesthetics, but you’d generally be crazy to get lenses that don’t actually do a reasonable job of correcting your vision or drinking water that will poison you.
I consider prioritizing truth over winning as fetishiizing truth.