The lower my estimated probability that the self-fulfilling prophecy will work for me, the less able I am to use the self-fulfilling prophecy as a tool, even if the estimated gains from the bet are large. How might I deal with this problem, specifically?
By not using doublethink? I know you didn’t want that questioned, but I’m going to call it into question by suggesting a different method, by illustrative example from personal experience.
The first time I considered doing a hundred-mile bicycle ride, once I had made the assessment that I could do it (I had never ridden further than 50 miles in one day before), I did not concern myself thereafter with wondering about the matter. That would be wasted motion: something which, predictably at the time you think it, will afterwards be seen to have contributed nothing to the task at hand. I had made a decision, I signed up for the event, I undertook what practice I judged useful, I turned up on the day, I completed the course. Belief that I could do it did not enter into the matter after that initial decision.
The key word is intention. This might be something similar to, or an instance of, what Brienne calls a “mental posture”. It’s something you do with your mind, not a proposition you believe. Decision screens off belief from action.
A great deal of complexity is buried underneath the simple word “implies” here.
A perfectly consistent and rational agent A, I agree, would likely be unable to intend to perform some task T in the absence of some reasonably high level of confidence in the proposition “A can do T,” which is close enough to what we colloquially mean by the belief that A can do T. After all, such an A would routinely evaluate the evidence for and against that proposition as part of the process of validating the intention.
(Of course, such an A might attempt T in order to obtain additional evidence. But that doesn’t involve the intention to do T so much as the intention to try to do T.)
The thing is, most humans don’t validate their intentions nearly this carefully, and it’s consequently quite possible for most humans to intend to do something in the absence of a belief that they can do it. This is inconsistent, yes, but we do it all the time.
Intending to do something implies the belief that you can do it.
The direction of causality is the reverse, though, and the two are causally separated by the decision. One assesses a situation and arrives at a decision about what to do. The decision made, one acts to carry it out. The decision screens off the beliefs from the action: the action should depend only on the decision, not additionally on the belief. Thinking all the while “but what if I fail? but what if I fail?” is a useless distraction. When one realises this, one does not allow oneself to be distracted.
A concrete example, again drawn from specific experiences. If I decide to run to catch a train that I might miss, I do not put a mere 50% effort into it if I am only 50% sure of catching the train. On the contrary, the decision made, I will run as fast as I can, up to the point where the outcome has been placed beyond any reasonable doubt. Either I get on the train before it leaves, or the train leaves before I can get on. At that point I can stop running.
By not using doublethink? I know you didn’t want that questioned, but I’m going to call it into question by suggesting a different method, by illustrative example from personal experience.
The first time I considered doing a hundred-mile bicycle ride, once I had made the assessment that I could do it (I had never ridden further than 50 miles in one day before), I did not concern myself thereafter with wondering about the matter. That would be wasted motion: something which, predictably at the time you think it, will afterwards be seen to have contributed nothing to the task at hand. I had made a decision, I signed up for the event, I undertook what practice I judged useful, I turned up on the day, I completed the course. Belief that I could do it did not enter into the matter after that initial decision.
The key word is intention. This might be something similar to, or an instance of, what Brienne calls a “mental posture”. It’s something you do with your mind, not a proposition you believe. Decision screens off belief from action.
Intending to do something implies the belief that you can do it.
A great deal of complexity is buried underneath the simple word “implies” here.
A perfectly consistent and rational agent A, I agree, would likely be unable to intend to perform some task T in the absence of some reasonably high level of confidence in the proposition “A can do T,” which is close enough to what we colloquially mean by the belief that A can do T. After all, such an A would routinely evaluate the evidence for and against that proposition as part of the process of validating the intention.
(Of course, such an A might attempt T in order to obtain additional evidence. But that doesn’t involve the intention to do T so much as the intention to try to do T.)
The thing is, most humans don’t validate their intentions nearly this carefully, and it’s consequently quite possible for most humans to intend to do something in the absence of a belief that they can do it. This is inconsistent, yes, but we do it all the time.
The direction of causality is the reverse, though, and the two are causally separated by the decision. One assesses a situation and arrives at a decision about what to do. The decision made, one acts to carry it out. The decision screens off the beliefs from the action: the action should depend only on the decision, not additionally on the belief. Thinking all the while “but what if I fail? but what if I fail?” is a useless distraction. When one realises this, one does not allow oneself to be distracted.
A concrete example, again drawn from specific experiences. If I decide to run to catch a train that I might miss, I do not put a mere 50% effort into it if I am only 50% sure of catching the train. On the contrary, the decision made, I will run as fast as I can, up to the point where the outcome has been placed beyond any reasonable doubt. Either I get on the train before it leaves, or the train leaves before I can get on. At that point I can stop running.