(I think) I’m arguing that if you have with some probability saved some people, and you intend to keep saving people, it is more efficient to keep saving the same set of people.
I assume you meant “more ethical” rather than “more efficient”? In other words, the correct metric shouldn’t just sum over QALYs, but should assign f(T) utils to a person with life of length T of reference quality, for f a convex function. Probably true, and I do wonder how it would affect charity ratings. But my guess is that the top charities of e.g. GiveWell will still be close to the top in this metric.
I don’t follow. Are you arguing that saving a person’s life is irresponsible if you don’t keep saving them?
(I think) I’m arguing that if you have with some probability saved some people, and you intend to keep saving people, it is more efficient to keep saving the same set of people.
I assume you meant “more ethical” rather than “more efficient”? In other words, the correct metric shouldn’t just sum over QALYs, but should assign f(T) utils to a person with life of length T of reference quality, for f a convex function. Probably true, and I do wonder how it would affect charity ratings. But my guess is that the top charities of e.g. GiveWell will still be close to the top in this metric.