So the same problem comes up there, even if no fact can be known with certainty.
If so, it seems to require a different argument to point to the problem in that case, since your argument in the post relied on “discrete knowledge”.
I don’t currently see what stops a radical probabilist from interpreting evidence as unreliable information about the wave function.
(I do have an intuition that this’ll be problematic; I’m just saying that I don’t currently see the argument, and I think it’s different from the argument in the post.)
If so, it seems to require a different argument to point to the problem in that case, since your argument in the post relied on “discrete knowledge”.
I don’t currently see what stops a radical probabilist from interpreting evidence as unreliable information about the wave function.
(I do have an intuition that this’ll be problematic; I’m just saying that I don’t currently see the argument, and I think it’s different from the argument in the post.)
Yes the argument has to be changed but that’s mostly an issue of wording. Just replace discrete knowledge with discrete factual evidence.
If a Bayesian sees that the detector has detected a photon, how is that evidence about the wave function?