but it is fairly obvious that Little Lucas isn’t around anymore.
You appear to have “solved” the bulk of the problem by assuming it away. If you carve a statue from a stone, the stone continues to exist. As the earth slowly gains mass due to the accretion of interstellar dust, it remains itself. There’s a very meaningful sense in which any tree or other living organism is continuous. There’s no doubt that the current Lucas is different from Young Lucas, but that could be (and basically has been) accomplished by modification and growth of Young Lucas.
I think the human mind is predisposed to think in terms of discrete people identities (either one person, one identity, or one person, one series of discrete identities), and has trouble comprehending this type of partial change. Thus, I think that, “Is young Lucas dead?” is a wrong question.
I think the human mind is predisposed to think in terms of discrete people identities, and has trouble comprehending this type of partial change.
It seems to me that human minds aren’t so disposed. Humans normally think of themselves in 10 years as still themselves. A person will identify strongly with minds wholly unlike their own if they share a history, such as a mind that was utterly distorted by drugs.
Both of those views are problematic, and both were intended by that statement; the original language has been clarified.
Because we think, “One person, one identity,” we get stuck at two extremes: I’m always one person, or I’m a continua of different people. Reality lies between the two, and does not fit comfortably with our intuitive understanding of personhood.
I agree that it is useful to group a casually related set of mind-moments under the label of “one person.” I just don’t think that this grouping of convenience makes those mind-moments the same. Each is a unique experience.
You appear to have “solved” the bulk of the problem by assuming it away. If you carve a statue from a stone, the stone continues to exist. As the earth slowly gains mass due to the accretion of interstellar dust, it remains itself. There’s a very meaningful sense in which any tree or other living organism is continuous. There’s no doubt that the current Lucas is different from Young Lucas, but that could be (and basically has been) accomplished by modification and growth of Young Lucas.
I think the human mind is predisposed to think in terms of discrete people identities (either one person, one identity, or one person, one series of discrete identities), and has trouble comprehending this type of partial change. Thus, I think that, “Is young Lucas dead?” is a wrong question.
It seems to me that human minds aren’t so disposed. Humans normally think of themselves in 10 years as still themselves. A person will identify strongly with minds wholly unlike their own if they share a history, such as a mind that was utterly distorted by drugs.
Both of those views are problematic, and both were intended by that statement; the original language has been clarified.
Because we think, “One person, one identity,” we get stuck at two extremes: I’m always one person, or I’m a continua of different people. Reality lies between the two, and does not fit comfortably with our intuitive understanding of personhood.
I agree that it is useful to group a casually related set of mind-moments under the label of “one person.” I just don’t think that this grouping of convenience makes those mind-moments the same. Each is a unique experience.