Legalizing blackmail gives people with otherwise no motivation to harm someone through the sharing of information the motive to do so. I’m going to take that as the dividing line between blackmail and other forms of trade or coercion. I believe this much is generally agreed on in this debate.
If you’re going to legalize forced negative-sum trades, I think you need a much stronger argument that assuming that, on net, the positive externalities will make it worthwhile. It’s a bit like legalizing violence from shopkeepers because most of the time they’re punching thieves. Maybe that’s true now, when shopkeepers punching people is illegal, but one, I think there’s a large onus on anyone suggesting this to justify that it’s the case, and two, is it really going to stay the case, once you’ve let the system run with this newfound form of legalized coercion?
Before I read these excerpts, I was pretty much in the ‘blackmail bad, duh’ category. After I read them, I was undecided; maybe it is in fact true that many harms from information sharing comes with sufficient positive externalities, and those that do not are sufficiently clearly delimited to be separately legislated. Having thought about it longer, I now see a lot of counterexamples. Consider some person, who:
had a traumatic childhood,
has a crush on another person, and is embarrassed about it,
has plans for a surprise party or gift for a close friend,
or the opposite; someone else is planning a surprise for them,
has an injury or disfiguration on a covered part of their body,
had a recent break-up, that they want to hold out on sharing with their friends for a while,
left an unkind partner, and doesn’t want that person to know they failed a recent exam,
posts anonymously for professional reasons, or to have a better work-life balance,
doesn’t like a coworker, but tries not to show it on the job.
I’m sure I could go on for quite a while. Legalizing blackmail means that people are de-facto incentivized to exploit information when it would harm people, because their payout stops being derived from the public interest, through mechanisms like public reception, appreciation from those directly helped by the reveal of information, or payment from a news agency, and becomes proportional almost purely to the damage you can do.
It’s true that in some cases these are things which should be generally disincentivized or made illegal, nonconsensual pornography being a prime example. In general I don’t think this approach scales, because the public interest is so context dependent. Sometimes it is in the public interest to share someone’s traumatic childhood, spoil a surprise or tell their coworker they are disliked. But the reward should be derived from the public interest, not the harm! If we want to monetarily incentivize people to share information they have on sexual abuse, pay them for sharing information that led to a conviction. And if you’re not wanting to do that because it causes the bad incentive to lie… surely blackmail gives more incentive to lie, and the accuser being paid requires the case never to have gone to trial, so is worse on all accounts.
I’m sure I could go on for quite a while. Legalizing blackmail means that people are de-facto incentivized to exploit information when it would harm people, because their payout stops being derived from the public interest
What if blackmail was only made legal in cases where there was a significant public benefit? (See here.)
I believe that would still be a departure from laws today (you’re not allowed to pay off whistleblowers, are you? or to accept such payment?), but seems like it might not have the downsides that you and others have highlighted of incentivizing finding ways to hurt others by sharing information in general.
It might be possible to convince me on something like that, as it fixes the largest problem, and if Hanson is right that blackmail would significantly reduce issues like sexual harassment then it’s at least worth consideration. I’m still disinclined towards the idea for other reasons (incentivizes false allegations, is low oversight, difficult to keep proportionality, can incentivize information hiding, seems complex to legislate), but I’m not sure how strong those reasons are.
It’s a bit like legalizing violence from shopkeepers because most of the time they’re punching thieves.
Robin Hanson argued that negative gossip is probably net positive for society.
Robin Hanson: On average, letting people know about other people’s dirt is a good thing.
The act of providing negative gossip to the public ‘for free’ is a public good. In a transaction-cost-free market, the blackmailer might try to sell the secret to the public (e.g. via assurance contract).
surely blackmail gives more incentive to lie
Lying about someone in a damaging way is already covered by libel/slander laws.
Robin Hanson argued that negative gossip is probably net positive for society.
Yes, this is what my post was addressing and the analogy was about. I consider it an interesting hypothesis, but not one that holds up to scrutiny.
Lying about someone in a damaging way is already covered by libel/slander laws.
I know, but this only further emphasizes how much better paying those who helped a conviction is. Blackmail is private, threat-based, and necessarily unpoliced, whereas the courts have oversight and are an at least somewhat impartial test for truth.
Legalizing blackmail gives people with otherwise no motivation to harm someone through the sharing of information the motive to do so. I’m going to take that as the dividing line between blackmail and other forms of trade or coercion. I believe this much is generally agreed on in this debate.
If you’re going to legalize forced negative-sum trades, I think you need a much stronger argument that assuming that, on net, the positive externalities will make it worthwhile. It’s a bit like legalizing violence from shopkeepers because most of the time they’re punching thieves. Maybe that’s true now, when shopkeepers punching people is illegal, but one, I think there’s a large onus on anyone suggesting this to justify that it’s the case, and two, is it really going to stay the case, once you’ve let the system run with this newfound form of legalized coercion?
Before I read these excerpts, I was pretty much in the ‘blackmail bad, duh’ category. After I read them, I was undecided; maybe it is in fact true that many harms from information sharing comes with sufficient positive externalities, and those that do not are sufficiently clearly delimited to be separately legislated. Having thought about it longer, I now see a lot of counterexamples. Consider some person, who:
had a traumatic childhood,
has a crush on another person, and is embarrassed about it,
has plans for a surprise party or gift for a close friend,
or the opposite; someone else is planning a surprise for them,
has an injury or disfiguration on a covered part of their body,
had a recent break-up, that they want to hold out on sharing with their friends for a while,
left an unkind partner, and doesn’t want that person to know they failed a recent exam,
posts anonymously for professional reasons, or to have a better work-life balance,
doesn’t like a coworker, but tries not to show it on the job.
I’m sure I could go on for quite a while. Legalizing blackmail means that people are de-facto incentivized to exploit information when it would harm people, because their payout stops being derived from the public interest, through mechanisms like public reception, appreciation from those directly helped by the reveal of information, or payment from a news agency, and becomes proportional almost purely to the damage you can do.
It’s true that in some cases these are things which should be generally disincentivized or made illegal, nonconsensual pornography being a prime example. In general I don’t think this approach scales, because the public interest is so context dependent. Sometimes it is in the public interest to share someone’s traumatic childhood, spoil a surprise or tell their coworker they are disliked. But the reward should be derived from the public interest, not the harm! If we want to monetarily incentivize people to share information they have on sexual abuse, pay them for sharing information that led to a conviction. And if you’re not wanting to do that because it causes the bad incentive to lie… surely blackmail gives more incentive to lie, and the accuser being paid requires the case never to have gone to trial, so is worse on all accounts.
What if blackmail was only made legal in cases where there was a significant public benefit? (See here.)
I believe that would still be a departure from laws today (you’re not allowed to pay off whistleblowers, are you? or to accept such payment?), but seems like it might not have the downsides that you and others have highlighted of incentivizing finding ways to hurt others by sharing information in general.
It might be possible to convince me on something like that, as it fixes the largest problem, and if Hanson is right that blackmail would significantly reduce issues like sexual harassment then it’s at least worth consideration. I’m still disinclined towards the idea for other reasons (incentivizes false allegations, is low oversight, difficult to keep proportionality, can incentivize information hiding, seems complex to legislate), but I’m not sure how strong those reasons are.
Robin Hanson argued that negative gossip is probably net positive for society.
The act of providing negative gossip to the public ‘for free’ is a public good. In a transaction-cost-free market, the blackmailer might try to sell the secret to the public (e.g. via assurance contract).
Lying about someone in a damaging way is already covered by libel/slander laws.
Yes, this is what my post was addressing and the analogy was about. I consider it an interesting hypothesis, but not one that holds up to scrutiny.
I know, but this only further emphasizes how much better paying those who helped a conviction is. Blackmail is private, threat-based, and necessarily unpoliced, whereas the courts have oversight and are an at least somewhat impartial test for truth.