Thanks for this post, I think it has high clarificational value and that your interpretation is valid and good. In my post, I failed to cite Y&S’s actual definition and should have been more careful. I ended up critiquing a definition that probably resembled MacAskill’s definition more than Y&S’s, and it seems to have been somewhat of an accidental strawperson. In fairness to me though, Y&S never offered any example with the minimal conditions for SD to apply in their original paper while I did. This is part of what led to MacAskill’s counterpost.
This all said, I do think there is something that my definition offers (clarifies?) that Y&S’s does not. Consider your example. Suppose I have played 100 Newcombian games and one-boxed each time. Your Omega will then predict that on the 101st, I’ll one-box again. If I make decisions independently each time I play the game, then we have the example you presented and which I agree with. But I think it’s more interesting if I am allowed to change my strategy. From my perspective as an agent trying to counfound Omega and win, I should not consider Omega’s predictions and my actions to subjuntively depend, and my definition would say so. Under the definition from Y&S, I think it’s less clear in this situation what I should think. Should say that we’re SD “so far”? Probably not. Should I wait until I finish all interaction with Omega and then decide whether or not we were SD in retrospect? Seems silly. So I think my definition may lead to a more practical understanding than Y&S’s.
Do you think we’re about on the same page? Thanks again for the post.
From my perspective as an agent trying to counfound Omega and win, I should not consider Omega’s predictions and my actions to subjuntively depend, and my definition would say so.
I think your definition does say so, and rightfully so. Your source code is run in the historical cases as well, so indirectly it does confound Omega. Or are you saying your source code changes? Then there’s no (or no full) subjunctive dependence with either definition. If your source code remains the same but your specific-for-each-game strategy changes, we can imagine something like using historical data as an observation in your strategy, in which case it can be different each time. But again, then there is no (or no full) subjunctive dependence with either definition. I might misunderstand what you mean though.
Thanks again for your reply, I think discussing this is important!
Thanks for this post, I think it has high clarificational value and that your interpretation is valid and good. In my post, I failed to cite Y&S’s actual definition and should have been more careful. I ended up critiquing a definition that probably resembled MacAskill’s definition more than Y&S’s, and it seems to have been somewhat of an accidental strawperson. In fairness to me though, Y&S never offered any example with the minimal conditions for SD to apply in their original paper while I did. This is part of what led to MacAskill’s counterpost.
This all said, I do think there is something that my definition offers (clarifies?) that Y&S’s does not. Consider your example. Suppose I have played 100 Newcombian games and one-boxed each time. Your Omega will then predict that on the 101st, I’ll one-box again. If I make decisions independently each time I play the game, then we have the example you presented and which I agree with. But I think it’s more interesting if I am allowed to change my strategy. From my perspective as an agent trying to counfound Omega and win, I should not consider Omega’s predictions and my actions to subjuntively depend, and my definition would say so. Under the definition from Y&S, I think it’s less clear in this situation what I should think. Should say that we’re SD “so far”? Probably not. Should I wait until I finish all interaction with Omega and then decide whether or not we were SD in retrospect? Seems silly. So I think my definition may lead to a more practical understanding than Y&S’s.
Do you think we’re about on the same page? Thanks again for the post.
Thanks for your reply!
I think your definition does say so, and rightfully so. Your source code is run in the historical cases as well, so indirectly it does confound Omega. Or are you saying your source code changes? Then there’s no (or no full) subjunctive dependence with either definition. If your source code remains the same but your specific-for-each-game strategy changes, we can imagine something like using historical data as an observation in your strategy, in which case it can be different each time. But again, then there is no (or no full) subjunctive dependence with either definition. I might misunderstand what you mean though.
Thanks again for your reply, I think discussing this is important!