It seems you are making a fairly basic mistake here, assuming that because all observation is theory-laden, that people who have different paradigms cannot communicate.
I’m not assuming this, or at least I don’t expect that I am, given that I don’t think it’s true. But the fact that we can communicate also doesn’t imply that there is a base observation language which we share and which provides a fixed normal. In other words, there are more than two options here. What would this language look like? It couldn’t include references to objective facts, since these can always be overturned by a theory. Mere experiences then? Aside from the serious problems sense data theories of epistemology face (and how unnecessary they are to preserve the empirical elements of science) there is simply the observation that no one who hasn’t been spending a lot of time with philosophers takes their normal world to consist in a collection of mere experiences.
We don’t require a base observation language: only the ability to point at things and agree that we are pointing at the same thing. The only thing that might qualify as a ‘base observation language’ is the neural impulses that send the sense data to my brain. Fortunate, then, that nature has taken care of that problem for us. It is the world, not our language about the world, that provides the fixed normal.
Further, the point of Egan’s law is that objective facts are not overturned by a theory. Rather, it is theories that are overturned by facts.
And of course your normal world doesn’t consist of just experiences: there are also your thoughts, dreams, emotions, motivations, theories, etc. Which is all well and good, and we can make observations about those, but we don’t have to. (We do, quite often, especially in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, but that’s a tangent) But experiences are how we determine what is true about the world, because that’s what works.
The only thing that might qualify as a ‘base observation language’ is the neural impulses that send the sense data to my brain. Fortunate, then, that nature has taken care of that problem for us. It is the world, not our language about the world, that provides the fixed normal.
I think this is something like the naturalistic fallacy in ethics: no physical or biological process can be said to have epistemic or justificatory value just because it is the kind of process that it is. This isn’t to say that such processes dont underlie my knowledge of the world in some sense, of course. The point is just that I can take a certain experience Of a blue object, say, as evidence for the existence of a blue object only because I have a bunch of prior knowledge about the relationship between those kinds of experiences and their correlation to the presence of blue objects in my visual field. Nothing about the firings of such and such a neural network is such as to be self-justifying or foundational. That would simply be a category mistake, like thinking that because my biology has produced in me certain inclinations toward my fellows, we can straight away take those inclinations to be a morality. Again, this doesn’t undermine the crucial importance of biology in our morality, just a certain way of concieving of that importance.
I think we’re miscommunicating on the ‘facts’ bit. What I mean is that if anything with extensional force, like ‘the apple is green’ can fall into the normal, then no theory should have to live up to it. The apple might really be blue. In fact, we might be convinced (haven’t we already?) that the physical objects of common sense, existing in space and enduring through time while bearing and changing properties like color are simply unreal. Science has superseded and contradicted common sense here, however much it might later explain the details of why we have the common sense picture that we do.
I’ll sum up my point by borrowing from someone else: ‘Empirical knowledge, like it’s sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put ANY claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.’
I want to tap out here, not because I think we’ve hit a dead end, but because I feel I’ve exhausted my resources. I’ve learned a lot from your replies, and I’ll happily read anything else you have to say on the matter. Thanks again.
I’m not assuming this, or at least I don’t expect that I am, given that I don’t think it’s true. But the fact that we can communicate also doesn’t imply that there is a base observation language which we share and which provides a fixed normal. In other words, there are more than two options here. What would this language look like? It couldn’t include references to objective facts, since these can always be overturned by a theory. Mere experiences then? Aside from the serious problems sense data theories of epistemology face (and how unnecessary they are to preserve the empirical elements of science) there is simply the observation that no one who hasn’t been spending a lot of time with philosophers takes their normal world to consist in a collection of mere experiences.
We don’t require a base observation language: only the ability to point at things and agree that we are pointing at the same thing. The only thing that might qualify as a ‘base observation language’ is the neural impulses that send the sense data to my brain. Fortunate, then, that nature has taken care of that problem for us. It is the world, not our language about the world, that provides the fixed normal.
Further, the point of Egan’s law is that objective facts are not overturned by a theory. Rather, it is theories that are overturned by facts.
And of course your normal world doesn’t consist of just experiences: there are also your thoughts, dreams, emotions, motivations, theories, etc. Which is all well and good, and we can make observations about those, but we don’t have to. (We do, quite often, especially in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, but that’s a tangent) But experiences are how we determine what is true about the world, because that’s what works.
I think this is something like the naturalistic fallacy in ethics: no physical or biological process can be said to have epistemic or justificatory value just because it is the kind of process that it is. This isn’t to say that such processes dont underlie my knowledge of the world in some sense, of course. The point is just that I can take a certain experience Of a blue object, say, as evidence for the existence of a blue object only because I have a bunch of prior knowledge about the relationship between those kinds of experiences and their correlation to the presence of blue objects in my visual field. Nothing about the firings of such and such a neural network is such as to be self-justifying or foundational. That would simply be a category mistake, like thinking that because my biology has produced in me certain inclinations toward my fellows, we can straight away take those inclinations to be a morality. Again, this doesn’t undermine the crucial importance of biology in our morality, just a certain way of concieving of that importance.
I think we’re miscommunicating on the ‘facts’ bit. What I mean is that if anything with extensional force, like ‘the apple is green’ can fall into the normal, then no theory should have to live up to it. The apple might really be blue. In fact, we might be convinced (haven’t we already?) that the physical objects of common sense, existing in space and enduring through time while bearing and changing properties like color are simply unreal. Science has superseded and contradicted common sense here, however much it might later explain the details of why we have the common sense picture that we do.
I’ll sum up my point by borrowing from someone else: ‘Empirical knowledge, like it’s sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put ANY claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.’
I want to tap out here, not because I think we’ve hit a dead end, but because I feel I’ve exhausted my resources. I’ve learned a lot from your replies, and I’ll happily read anything else you have to say on the matter. Thanks again.