The thing-in-itself indeed ties somewhat more clearly to the HPL mythos beings, in that they are (by majority; or at least the major ones in the pantheon) supposed to not be three-dimensional in the first place. The thing-in-itself is the object without having to be rendered by any specific observer’s point of view.
While in (most) philosophy one doesn’t examine a topic which is able to cause anxiety, the notions themselves do negate a possible anxiety which would be caused by any examination, in my view. Again, even the notion of the thing-in-itself is formulated as a singular point in a plane: you cannot analyze it to anything, because by definition it connotes impossibility to analyze or attribute qualities to it. It exists only as an idea of difference.
To use a simple example (not for you, who obviously are familiar with the notion), and to tie this to Parmenides (and Plato) which I mentioned in passing in my article:
While a desk gets picked up as something in 3D space, with form, size and other qualities, theoretically one can assume that the same object (desk) still would exist as something, even if its observer had no ability to sense space, position, movement or the other core qualities humans pick up with the senses. So the desk, assuming it exists for any observer regardless of what abilities that observer has, will have some unknown qualities that aren’t dependent on observation; in this sense it is a thing as it is, a thing-in-itself, not to be known and distinct from any view we have of it.
Useful to note that while Kant made the term more popular, the thing-in-itself was already a known term in Plato’s time and is mentioned frequently (eg) in the dialogue between Socrates and Parmenides.
The thing-in-itself indeed ties somewhat more clearly to the HPL mythos beings, in that they are (by majority; or at least the major ones in the pantheon) supposed to not be three-dimensional in the first place. The thing-in-itself is the object without having to be rendered by any specific observer’s point of view.
While in (most) philosophy one doesn’t examine a topic which is able to cause anxiety, the notions themselves do negate a possible anxiety which would be caused by any examination, in my view. Again, even the notion of the thing-in-itself is formulated as a singular point in a plane: you cannot analyze it to anything, because by definition it connotes impossibility to analyze or attribute qualities to it. It exists only as an idea of difference.
To use a simple example (not for you, who obviously are familiar with the notion), and to tie this to Parmenides (and Plato) which I mentioned in passing in my article:
While a desk gets picked up as something in 3D space, with form, size and other qualities, theoretically one can assume that the same object (desk) still would exist as something, even if its observer had no ability to sense space, position, movement or the other core qualities humans pick up with the senses. So the desk, assuming it exists for any observer regardless of what abilities that observer has, will have some unknown qualities that aren’t dependent on observation; in this sense it is a thing as it is, a thing-in-itself, not to be known and distinct from any view we have of it.
Useful to note that while Kant made the term more popular, the thing-in-itself was already a known term in Plato’s time and is mentioned frequently (eg) in the dialogue between Socrates and Parmenides.