Meanwhile, I’d also pounce on the “Ontological Alternatives” chapter there to ask a slightly unrelated question: Regarding the “fourth option” there, has anyone ever tried to analyze a world ontology where, unlike here, particles can belong to multiple different worlds according to some kind of rule or per-particle basis? e.g. Instead of having a particle belong to World # 872 as an elementary property, which lets it only interact with other W-872 particles, it would have a set of “keys” where any other particle that also has at least one of those keys can be interacted with, while that other particle might have a slightly different keyset and thus be able to interact with a third particle “located” right next to the first one (insofar as position of two non-interacting particles is relevant to the second one in question)?
I realize I’m throwing ideas around while having no idea at all what I’m talking about, but at the same time from where I’m sitting it feels like all the “sides” of the QM interpretation debates always share a humongous bag of uncontested assumptions. Namely, assumptions about pesky details like “position” being a necessary, elemental and fundamental property of particles.
I haven’t read Sebens’ article and my a priori estimate of its value is very low. Maybe I’ll take a look at it later.
Regarding what you write about particles. Particles are not fundamental entities in modern physics: quantum fields are (or quantum string fields, whatever the latter are). A state of matter can only be described as a collection of particles in certain limits and approximations. The position of a particle is especially ill defined because of Compton wavelength non-locality in quantum relativity.
Also thinking of QM worlds as “keys” is not a good idea. The wavefunction can only be decomposed into “worlds” as a macroscopic approximation, there are no “worlds” on the fundamental level.
Meanwhile, I’d also pounce on the “Ontological Alternatives” chapter there to ask a slightly unrelated question: Regarding the “fourth option” there, has anyone ever tried to analyze a world ontology where, unlike here, particles can belong to multiple different worlds according to some kind of rule or per-particle basis? e.g. Instead of having a particle belong to World # 872 as an elementary property, which lets it only interact with other W-872 particles, it would have a set of “keys” where any other particle that also has at least one of those keys can be interacted with, while that other particle might have a slightly different keyset and thus be able to interact with a third particle “located” right next to the first one (insofar as position of two non-interacting particles is relevant to the second one in question)?
I realize I’m throwing ideas around while having no idea at all what I’m talking about, but at the same time from where I’m sitting it feels like all the “sides” of the QM interpretation debates always share a humongous bag of uncontested assumptions. Namely, assumptions about pesky details like “position” being a necessary, elemental and fundamental property of particles.
I haven’t read Sebens’ article and my a priori estimate of its value is very low. Maybe I’ll take a look at it later.
Regarding what you write about particles. Particles are not fundamental entities in modern physics: quantum fields are (or quantum string fields, whatever the latter are). A state of matter can only be described as a collection of particles in certain limits and approximations. The position of a particle is especially ill defined because of Compton wavelength non-locality in quantum relativity.
Also thinking of QM worlds as “keys” is not a good idea. The wavefunction can only be decomposed into “worlds” as a macroscopic approximation, there are no “worlds” on the fundamental level.
It strikes me as a potentially fruitful SF novel idea.