Actually, one problem with ‘realpolitik’ theories in international politics is that they assume that states do care, specifically about their safety from outside coercion. This is quite strange when you think about it. Even when an inpersonal institution appears to ‘care’ about something, say a business caring about profit, this is typically a result of well-defined incentive structures, such as residual claimants controlling the business. But there is no equivalent for states (except for strong monarchies, dictatorships or oligarchies—or neocameralist/formalist polities), so how is this realpolitik thing supposed to work? Maybe it could work like PUA after all—evolutionary dynamics in the course of history have led states to pick up lots of adaptations that improve their security, and they execute on these adaptations even if they aren’t security maximizers?
Actually, one problem with ‘realpolitik’ theories in international politics is that they assume that states do care, specifically about their safety from outside coercion. This is quite strange when you think about it. Even when an inpersonal institution appears to ‘care’ about something, say a business caring about profit, this is typically a result of well-defined incentive structures, such as residual claimants controlling the business. But there is no equivalent for states (except for strong monarchies, dictatorships or oligarchies—or neocameralist/formalist polities), so how is this realpolitik thing supposed to work? Maybe it could work like PUA after all—evolutionary dynamics in the course of history have led states to pick up lots of adaptations that improve their security, and they execute on these adaptations even if they aren’t security maximizers?
It’s very dangerous to play at evolutionary psychology when one isn’t from the field. I’d abstain.