You should choose the false belief, because Omega has optimized it for instrumental utility whereas the true belief has been optimized for disutility, and you may be vulnerable to such effects if only because you’re not a perfectly rational agent.
If you were sure that no hazardous true information (or advantageous false information) could possibly exist, you should still be indifferent between the two choices: either of these would yield a neutral belief, leaving you with very nearly the same utility as before.
That is my point entirely, yes. This is a conflict between epistemic and instrumental rationality; if you value anything higher than truth, you will get more of it by choosing the falsehood. That’s how the problem is defined.
You should choose the false belief, because Omega has optimized it for instrumental utility whereas the true belief has been optimized for disutility, and you may be vulnerable to such effects if only because you’re not a perfectly rational agent.
If you were sure that no hazardous true information (or advantageous false information) could possibly exist, you should still be indifferent between the two choices: either of these would yield a neutral belief, leaving you with very nearly the same utility as before.
That is my point entirely, yes. This is a conflict between epistemic and instrumental rationality; if you value anything higher than truth, you will get more of it by choosing the falsehood. That’s how the problem is defined.