Probably most LWers are familiar with it, but Hofstadter’s classic “A conversation with Einstein’s Brain” is a good read on these same questions.
I am always confused, too, when I think these questions. The only way I can think of solving the puzzles without rejecting computationalism is to reject an ultimate distinction between a computation existing abstractly and a computation being ran, and go in the Tegmarkian direction of a fully Platonic ontology of abstract forms, among them computations, among them us. But since I don’t find this believable (gut reaction, which I acknowledge irrational but I can’t remedy) I go back in practice to either rejecting computationalism, at least in its strong forms, or assuming there is another solution to the puzzles which I cannot think of.
While I accept computationalism only for intentionality (i.e. semantics, knowledge, etc.) and not qualia, I don’t see why computationalists of all stripes shouldn’t insist that a computation must actually run. EY’s Timeless Causality post looks relevant, offering a redefinition of running a computation in terms of causal relations, rather than, necessarily, requiring extension in time.
Probably most LWers are familiar with it, but Hofstadter’s classic “A conversation with Einstein’s Brain” is a good read on these same questions.
I am always confused, too, when I think these questions. The only way I can think of solving the puzzles without rejecting computationalism is to reject an ultimate distinction between a computation existing abstractly and a computation being ran, and go in the Tegmarkian direction of a fully Platonic ontology of abstract forms, among them computations, among them us. But since I don’t find this believable (gut reaction, which I acknowledge irrational but I can’t remedy) I go back in practice to either rejecting computationalism, at least in its strong forms, or assuming there is another solution to the puzzles which I cannot think of.
While I accept computationalism only for intentionality (i.e. semantics, knowledge, etc.) and not qualia, I don’t see why computationalists of all stripes shouldn’t insist that a computation must actually run. EY’s Timeless Causality post looks relevant, offering a redefinition of running a computation in terms of causal relations, rather than, necessarily, requiring extension in time.