I share your concerns with growth and epistemics, but haven’t been able to articulate it with anywhere near the degree of precision or evidence I have in this post. If you have any specifics you could point me to (including anecdotal) I’d really appreciate it.
My thinking about this (3 minute read) is that EA will be deliberately hijacked by an external organization or force, not a gradual erosion of epistemic norms causing EA to become less healthy, which is the focus of this post. I generally focus on high-tech cognitive hacks, not the old-fashioned use of writing by humans that this post focuses on (using human intelligence to find galaxy-brained combinations of words that maximize for effect).
But I think that an internal conflict between animal welfare and the rest of EA is at risk of being exploited by outsiders, particularly vested interests that EA steps on such as those related to the AI race (e.g. Facebook or Intelligence Agencies).
My thinking about this (3 minute read) is that EA will be deliberately hijacked by an external organization or force
The recent examples linked from LW on the EA forum of (my personal judgement) batshit craziness about animal welfare (e.g. 12 (ETA: 14) bees are worth 1 human) has had me wondering about entryism by batshit crazy animal rights folks.
This is a misrepresentation of what the report says. The report says that, conditional on hedonism, valence symmetry, the animals being sentient, and other assumptions, the intensity of positive/negative valence that a bee can experience is 7% that of the positive/negative intensity that a human can experience. How to value creatures based on the intensities of positively/negatively valenced states they are capable of is a separate question, even if you fully accept the assumptions. (ETA: If you assume utilitarianism and hedonism etc., I think it is pretty reasonable to anchor moral weight (of a year of life) in range of intensity of positive/negative valence, while of course keeping the substantial uncertainties around all this in mind.)
On bees in particular, the authors write:
We also find it implausible that bees have larger welfare ranges than salmon. But (a) we’re also worried about pro-vertebrate bias; (b) bees are reallyimpressive; (c) there’s a great deal of overlap in the plausible welfare ranges for these two types of animals, so we aren’t claiming that their welfare ranges are significantly different; and (d) we don’t know how to adjust the scores in a non-arbitrary way. So, we’ve let the result stand.
I think when engaging in name-calling (“batshit crazy animal rights folks”) it is especially important to get things right.
(COI: The referenced report was produced by my employer, though a different department.)
This is a misrepresentation of what the report says.
The report:
Instead, we’re usually comparing either improving animal welfare (welfare reforms) or preventing animals from coming into existence (diet change → reduction in production levels) with improving human welfare or saving human lives.
I don’t think he’s misrepresenting what the report says at all. Trevor gets the central point of the post perfectly. The post’s response to the heading “So you’re saying that one person = ~three chickens?” is, no, that’s just the year to year of life comparison, chickens have shorter lives than humans so the life-to-life comparison is more like 1⁄16. Absolutely insane. From the post:
Then, humans have, on average, 16x this animal’s capacity for welfare; equivalently, its capacity for welfare is 0.0625x a human’s capacity for welfare.
And elsewhere people say that capacity for welfare is how one should do cause prioritization. So the simple conclusion is one human life = 16 chicken lives. The organization is literally called “Rethinking Priorities” i.e. stop prioritizing humans so much and accept all our unintuitive, mostly guess-based math that we use to argue how animal welfare can trump your own welfare. The post uses more words than that sure but tradeoffs between animal and human lives is the central point of the post and really the whole sequence. If I sound angry it’s because I am. Saying that a human life is comparable to a certain number of animal lives is very close to pure evil on top of being insane.
You further say:
The report says that, conditional on hedonism, valence symmetry, the animals being sentient, and other assumptions, the intensity of positive/negative valence that a bee can experience is 7% that of the positive/negative intensity that a human can experience.
And no, the report really doesn’t say that. The report says that somehow, people should still mostly accept Rethinking Priotities’ conclusions even if they disagree with the assumptions:
“I don’t share this project’s assumptions. Can’t I just ignore the results?” We don’t think so. First, if unitarianism is false, then it would be reasonable to discount our estimates by some factor or other. However, the alternative—hierarchicalism, according to which some kinds of welfare matter more than others or some individuals’ welfare matters more than others’ welfare—is very hard to defend. (
Second, and as we’ve argued, rejecting hedonism might lead you to reduce our non-human animal estimates by ~⅔, but not by much more than that.
So, skepticism about sentience might lead you to discount our estimates, but probably by fairly modest rates.
In response to someone commenting in part:
saving human lives is net positive
The post author’s reply is:
This is a very interesting result; thanks for sharing it. I’ve heard of others reaching the same conclusion, though I haven’t seen their models. If you’re willing, I’d love to see the calculations. But no pressure at all.
My takeaway from the whole thing is that you’re running a motte and bailey where
Motte = We’re just doing an analysis of the range of positive to negative experience that animals can feel as compared to a human
Bailey = We’re doing the above and also range of positive to negative experience is how we should decide allocation of resources between species.
Assuming you have the singular “you” in mind, no, I do not think I am not running a motte and bailey. I said above that if you accept the assumptions, I think using the ranges as (provisional, highly uncertain) moral weights is pretty reasonable, but I also think it’s reasonable to reject the assumptions. I do think it is true that some people have (mis)interpreted the report and made stronger claims than is warranted, but the report is also full of caveats and (I think) states its assumptions and results clearly.
The report:
Instead, we’re usually comparing either improving animal welfare (welfare reforms) or preventing animals from coming into existence (diet change → reduction in production levels) with improving human welfare or saving human lives.
Yes, the report is intended to guide decision-making in this way. It is not intended to provide a be-all-end-all estimate. The results still need to be interpreted in the context of the assumptions (which are clearly stated up front). I would take it as one input when making decisions, not the only input.
The post’s response to the heading “So you’re saying that one person = ~three chickens?” is, no, that’s just the year to year of life comparison, chickens have shorter lives than humans so the life-to-life comparison is more like 1⁄16. Absolutely insane.
No, that is not the post’s response to that heading. It also says: “No. We’re estimating the relative peak intensities of different animals’ valenced states at a given time. So, if a given animal has a welfare range of 0.5 (and we assume that welfare ranges are symmetrical around the neutral point), that means something like, ‘The best and worst experiences that this animal can have are half as intense as the best and worst experiences that a human can have’ [...]” There is a difference between comparing the most positive/negative valenced states an animal can achieve and their moral worth.
The report says that somehow, people should still mostly accept Rethinking Priotities’ conclusions even if they disagree with the assumptions:
“I don’t share this project’s assumptions. Can’t I just ignore the results?” We don’t think so. First, if unitarianism is false, then it would be reasonable to discount our estimates by some factor or other. However, the alternative—hierarchicalism, according to which some kinds of welfare matter more than others or some individuals’ welfare matters more than others’ welfare—is very hard to defend.
I think I disagree with your characterization, but it depends a bit on what you mean by “mostly”. The report makes a weaker claim, that if you don’t accept the premises, you shouldn’t totally ignore the conclusions (as opposed to “mostly accepting” the conclusions). The idea is that even if you don’t accept hedonism, it would be weird if capacity for positively/negatively valenced experiences didn’t matter at all when determining moral weights. That seems reasonable to me and I don’t really see the issue?
So if you factor in life span (taking 2 months for a drone) and do the ⅔ reduction for not accepting hedonism, you get a median of 1 human life = ~20K bee lives, given the report’s other assumptions. That’s 3 OOMs more than what Richard Kennaway wrote above.
In response to someone commenting in part:
saving human lives is net positive
The post author’s reply is:
This is a very interesting result; thanks for sharing it. I’ve heard of others reaching the same conclusion, though I haven’t seen their models. If you’re willing, I’d love to see the calculations. But no pressure at all.
I am not sure what you are trying to say here, could you clarify?
I’m going by the summary by jefftk that I linked to. Having glanced at the material it’s based on, and your links, I am not inclined to root through it all to make a more considered assessment. I suspect I would only end up painting a similar picture with a finer brush. Their methods of getting to the strange places they end up already appear to require more of my attention to understand than I am willing to spend on the issue.
I share your concerns with growth and epistemics, but haven’t been able to articulate it with anywhere near the degree of precision or evidence I have in this post. If you have any specifics you could point me to (including anecdotal) I’d really appreciate it.
My thinking about this (3 minute read) is that EA will be deliberately hijacked by an external organization or force, not a gradual erosion of epistemic norms causing EA to become less healthy, which is the focus of this post. I generally focus on high-tech cognitive hacks, not the old-fashioned use of writing by humans that this post focuses on (using human intelligence to find galaxy-brained combinations of words that maximize for effect).
But I think that an internal conflict between animal welfare and the rest of EA is at risk of being exploited by outsiders, particularly vested interests that EA steps on such as those related to the AI race (e.g. Facebook or Intelligence Agencies).
The recent examples linked from LW on the EA forum of (my personal judgement) batshit craziness about animal welfare (e.g. 12 (ETA: 14) bees are worth 1 human) has had me wondering about entryism by batshit crazy animal rights folks.
ETA: What’s Ziz up to these days?
This is a misrepresentation of what the report says. The report says that, conditional on hedonism, valence symmetry, the animals being sentient, and other assumptions, the intensity of positive/negative valence that a bee can experience is 7% that of the positive/negative intensity that a human can experience. How to value creatures based on the intensities of positively/negatively valenced states they are capable of is a separate question, even if you fully accept the assumptions. (ETA: If you assume utilitarianism and hedonism etc., I think it is pretty reasonable to anchor moral weight (of a year of life) in range of intensity of positive/negative valence, while of course keeping the substantial uncertainties around all this in mind.)
On bees in particular, the authors write:
I think when engaging in name-calling (“batshit crazy animal rights folks”) it is especially important to get things right.
(COI: The referenced report was produced by my employer, though a different department.)
The report:
I don’t think he’s misrepresenting what the report says at all. Trevor gets the central point of the post perfectly. The post’s response to the heading “So you’re saying that one person = ~three chickens?” is, no, that’s just the year to year of life comparison, chickens have shorter lives than humans so the life-to-life comparison is more like 1⁄16. Absolutely insane. From the post:
And elsewhere people say that capacity for welfare is how one should do cause prioritization. So the simple conclusion is one human life = 16 chicken lives. The organization is literally called “Rethinking Priorities” i.e. stop prioritizing humans so much and accept all our unintuitive, mostly guess-based math that we use to argue how animal welfare can trump your own welfare. The post uses more words than that sure but tradeoffs between animal and human lives is the central point of the post and really the whole sequence. If I sound angry it’s because I am. Saying that a human life is comparable to a certain number of animal lives is very close to pure evil on top of being insane.
You further say:
And no, the report really doesn’t say that. The report says that somehow, people should still mostly accept Rethinking Priotities’ conclusions even if they disagree with the assumptions:
In response to someone commenting in part:
The post author’s reply is:
My takeaway from the whole thing is that you’re running a motte and bailey where
Motte = We’re just doing an analysis of the range of positive to negative experience that animals can feel as compared to a human
Bailey = We’re doing the above and also range of positive to negative experience is how we should decide allocation of resources between species.
Assuming you have the singular “you” in mind, no, I do not think I am not running a motte and bailey. I said above that if you accept the assumptions, I think using the ranges as (provisional, highly uncertain) moral weights is pretty reasonable, but I also think it’s reasonable to reject the assumptions. I do think it is true that some people have (mis)interpreted the report and made stronger claims than is warranted, but the report is also full of caveats and (I think) states its assumptions and results clearly.
Yes, the report is intended to guide decision-making in this way. It is not intended to provide a be-all-end-all estimate. The results still need to be interpreted in the context of the assumptions (which are clearly stated up front). I would take it as one input when making decisions, not the only input.
No, that is not the post’s response to that heading. It also says: “No. We’re estimating the relative peak intensities of different animals’ valenced states at a given time. So, if a given animal has a welfare range of 0.5 (and we assume that welfare ranges are symmetrical around the neutral point), that means something like, ‘The best and worst experiences that this animal can have are half as intense as the best and worst experiences that a human can have’ [...]” There is a difference between comparing the most positive/negative valenced states an animal can achieve and their moral worth.
I think I disagree with your characterization, but it depends a bit on what you mean by “mostly”. The report makes a weaker claim, that if you don’t accept the premises, you shouldn’t totally ignore the conclusions (as opposed to “mostly accepting” the conclusions). The idea is that even if you don’t accept hedonism, it would be weird if capacity for positively/negatively valenced experiences didn’t matter at all when determining moral weights. That seems reasonable to me and I don’t really see the issue?
So if you factor in life span (taking 2 months for a drone) and do the ⅔ reduction for not accepting hedonism, you get a median of 1 human life = ~20K bee lives, given the report’s other assumptions. That’s 3 OOMs more than what Richard Kennaway wrote above.
I am not sure what you are trying to say here, could you clarify?
I’m going by the summary by jefftk that I linked to. Having glanced at the material it’s based on, and your links, I am not inclined to root through it all to make a more considered assessment. I suspect I would only end up painting a similar picture with a finer brush. Their methods of getting to the strange places they end up already appear to require more of my attention to understand than I am willing to spend on the issue.