In the case of sex, I propose a different demarcation criterion between ethical and unethical social influence than yours. The dimension I’m most concerned with is not remorse or lack thereof after the fact, but rather the reasons for consent at the moment of consent. In the past, I proposed the following definition for ethical seduction on a pickup blog:
Taking intentional action to create a context that raises someone’s chances of wanting to be sexual with you of their own free will out of anticipation of intrinsic enjoyment of the experience.
The “anticipation of intrinsic enjoyment of the experience” criterion is important, because it gets rid of cases where people consent to sex out of feelings of obligation, pity, merely because the other person wants it, or because they had trouble putting on the brakes. This notion is similar to the notion of “enthusiastic consent,” but without the confusing connotations that “enthusiastic” may hold.
I’m not sure whether this is a perfect or merely an imperfect duty. The argument for this principle being a perfect duty is that if someone has sex with you for reasons other than anticipating inherent enjoyment of the experience (which includes emotional enjoyment, not just physical), there is too high a chance that they won’t enjoy it and feel buyer’s remorse later. As a result, the argument would be that you should refrain from having sex with people in such circumstances, unless you know that they are aware of the potential negative consequences and are willing to risk them.
I’m not convinced either way about this argument, but it’s plausible. It’s actually really hard to think about ethical principles around influence that aren’t or overly broad, and that don’t contradict our existing moral intuitions. If someone thinks they have one, they should try as hard as they can to poke holes in it.
In the case of sex, I propose a different demarcation criterion between ethical and unethical social influence than yours. The dimension I’m most concerned with is not remorse or lack thereof after the fact, but rather the reasons for consent at the moment of consent. In the past, I proposed the following definition for ethical seduction on a pickup blog:
The “anticipation of intrinsic enjoyment of the experience” criterion is important, because it gets rid of cases where people consent to sex out of feelings of obligation, pity, merely because the other person wants it, or because they had trouble putting on the brakes. This notion is similar to the notion of “enthusiastic consent,” but without the confusing connotations that “enthusiastic” may hold.
I’m not sure whether this is a perfect or merely an imperfect duty. The argument for this principle being a perfect duty is that if someone has sex with you for reasons other than anticipating inherent enjoyment of the experience (which includes emotional enjoyment, not just physical), there is too high a chance that they won’t enjoy it and feel buyer’s remorse later. As a result, the argument would be that you should refrain from having sex with people in such circumstances, unless you know that they are aware of the potential negative consequences and are willing to risk them.
I’m not convinced either way about this argument, but it’s plausible. It’s actually really hard to think about ethical principles around influence that aren’t or overly broad, and that don’t contradict our existing moral intuitions. If someone thinks they have one, they should try as hard as they can to poke holes in it.
P.S. Sorry about the triple-post brain dump.