That’s a good distinction, but it’s not Kant’s. For Kant, a perfect duty is prohibitive (“don’t lie”) while an imperfect duty is one which demands the pursuit of some end, like “develop your talents”. The ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ refer to a grammatical distinction: perfect duties are complete when you’re not murdering people, etc. while imperfect duties are never complete and always ongoing.
I don’t know (or care much) about what Kant said but wikipedia seems to be closer to Hugh’s usage than yours.
Well, in case a fit of curiosity about Kant strikes you, the relevant discussion is in Metaphysics of Morals (not the Groundwork) 6:390ff. Neither Hugh’s interpretation nor mine is obviously correct and I think the matter is up for discussion. Hugh is right that a failure to pursue imperfect duties isn’t vicious or a transgression by Kant’s lights, but I think it’s neverless wrong to attribute to Kant the possibility of supererogatory action. imperfect duties are flexable because they can be trumped by other dutoes, not because they can be passed over. Failure to pursue imperfect duties is still moral failure, just not a failure of the same species as moral transgression.
You should give Kant a glance though. Perhaps his work is not strictly relevant to the question of machine morality (I think he might argue against the possibility of a moral machine), but it’s still very interesting stuff, even to argue against.
I don’t know (or care much) about what Kant said but wikipedia seems to be closer to Hugh’s usage than yours.
Well, in case a fit of curiosity about Kant strikes you, the relevant discussion is in Metaphysics of Morals (not the Groundwork) 6:390ff. Neither Hugh’s interpretation nor mine is obviously correct and I think the matter is up for discussion. Hugh is right that a failure to pursue imperfect duties isn’t vicious or a transgression by Kant’s lights, but I think it’s neverless wrong to attribute to Kant the possibility of supererogatory action. imperfect duties are flexable because they can be trumped by other dutoes, not because they can be passed over. Failure to pursue imperfect duties is still moral failure, just not a failure of the same species as moral transgression.
You should give Kant a glance though. Perhaps his work is not strictly relevant to the question of machine morality (I think he might argue against the possibility of a moral machine), but it’s still very interesting stuff, even to argue against.