You are correct in pointing out that for human agents the evaluation procedure is not a deliberate calculation of expected utility, but some messy computation we have little access to. In many instances this can however be reasonably well translated into the framework of (partial) utility functions, especially if our preferences approximately satisfy transitivity, continuity and independence.
For noticing discrepancies between true and substitute utility it is not necessary to exactly know both functions, it suffices to have an icky feeling that tells you that you are acting in a way that is detrimental to your (true) goals.
If all else fails we can time-index world states and equip the agent with a utility function by pretending that he assigned utility of 1 to the world state he actually brought about and 0 to the others. ;)
You are correct in pointing out that for human agents the evaluation procedure is not a deliberate calculation of expected utility, but some messy computation we have little access to. In many instances this can however be reasonably well translated into the framework of (partial) utility functions, especially if our preferences approximately satisfy transitivity, continuity and independence.
For noticing discrepancies between true and substitute utility it is not necessary to exactly know both functions, it suffices to have an icky feeling that tells you that you are acting in a way that is detrimental to your (true) goals.
If all else fails we can time-index world states and equip the agent with a utility function by pretending that he assigned utility of 1 to the world state he actually brought about and 0 to the others. ;)