I’m not certain where the problem lies, but I suspect that you may be misunderstanding the term “logical impossibility”. It would not be used to indicate that you have come up with an argument that shows that something is impossible. Instead it would be used to indicate that something is actually impossible in any consistent universe.
To clarify, if I make the argument that 1. Socrates is a man, and 2. all men are mortal, that does not make it logically impossible for Socrates to live forever; it just means that I can show logically that Socrates won’t die as long as these statements hold.
Logically impossible things are generally things like a square circle (exactly 4 right angles and exactly 0 angles in the same 2d shape); if they exist, it is because you misunderstand the terms being used in some way; if someone claims that this qualifies as a square circle, they have misunderstood what I am trying to communicate.
Likewise, people may say that an entity cannot be perfectly good and have allowed the holocaust; this might qualify god as a logical impossibility—if we accept this judgement of morality, if we believe that god is perfectly good, and if we believe that the holocaust happened.
You could perhaps come up with a scenario in which God, being perfectly good, absolutely needed to implant memories of the holocaust into each of our memories.… or you could simply define god as an evil being. so I would say that “logical impossibility” is a bit strong.
To clarify, if I make the argument that 1. Socrates is a man, and 2. all men are mortal, that does not make it logically impossible for Socrates to live forever; it just means that I can show logically that Socrates won’t die as long as these statements hold.
Given this premise, I now agree that I misunderstood >‘the term “logical impossibility”.’
Though, I unfortunately don’t understand what it does mean. I’ll look it up now and see if that further clarifies.
So from the Wikipedia page, I now understand stand it as something whereby the components of the logical equation in some way denote that the other components are incompatible with it, perhaps they denote some character of the other components at a level of analysis beyond one particular level of characterisation or grouping.
However, if it also comes down to what a particular person can conceive as possibility, doesn’t that come down to a particular person’s ability to visualise, imagine or recombine concepts into a coherent whole—which almost certainly various between those more cognitively flexible and those who aren’t?
In the Wikipedia example, understand why the sky is blue, not just at the physical level but psychological level of description, helps me imagine why someone might claim something apparently absurd like “the sky isn’t a sky”.
btw,w hen I googled for logical impossibility to get the Wikipage it suggested this stack exchange question
if it also comes down to what a particular person can conceive as possibility
I think I see the problem. Whenever any philosopher says that something is logically impossible, they are specifically and openly aware that this is only conditionally true. For example, a square circle is only clearly a logical impossibility if the words square and circle mean the same thing every time I think them, including in the time period that I move from ‘square’ to ‘circle’; if the ideas of ‘square’ and ‘circle’ actually do have a referent, and I am not just deluded into feeling a clear sense of meaning when I think those words, (and including all defining terms [such as ‘right angle’]); if I am correct in believing that two non-identical things are necessarily not one thing; if I am correct in believing language can refer to things other than semantic relationships; and many other fun things, including the big one: the assumption that I exist and am thinking.
However, once you have gotten everyone on the same page, and we all admit that we cannot prove that we exist, we start talking about highly conditional realities, such as those in which BattleGround God is more than a deluded memory, in which the words on the LessWrong are entered by other people, realities in which computers and circles and ‘good’ actually exist in some meaningful sense…
...and we don’t all have the same set of conditionally accepted realities. Nor do we need to in order to make most arguments intelligible to both parties. As a matter of course, most of the things we talk about are propositioned on the existence of the external world as reported by our senses and the media. If we deviate from this, we specify this in some way.
And that explains logical impossibility… but then I realized that I hadn’t read your original question carefully enough.
‘It is strange to say that God is a logical impossibility, but you don’t know whether God exists. If God is a logical impossibility, then surely She can’t exist, and so you know that She doesn’t exist.’
BG has conflated “belief that God is a logical impossibility” and “you know that She doesn’t exist.” The second claim should be “you believe that She doesn’t exist.” BG tried too hard, and it fails. Next time, use a Real Philosopher(TM).
I’m not certain where the problem lies, but I suspect that you may be misunderstanding the term “logical impossibility”. It would not be used to indicate that you have come up with an argument that shows that something is impossible. Instead it would be used to indicate that something is actually impossible in any consistent universe.
To clarify, if I make the argument that 1. Socrates is a man, and 2. all men are mortal, that does not make it logically impossible for Socrates to live forever; it just means that I can show logically that Socrates won’t die as long as these statements hold.
Logically impossible things are generally things like a square circle (exactly 4 right angles and exactly 0 angles in the same 2d shape); if they exist, it is because you misunderstand the terms being used in some way; if someone claims that this qualifies as a square circle, they have misunderstood what I am trying to communicate.
Likewise, people may say that an entity cannot be perfectly good and have allowed the holocaust; this might qualify god as a logical impossibility—if we accept this judgement of morality, if we believe that god is perfectly good, and if we believe that the holocaust happened.
You could perhaps come up with a scenario in which God, being perfectly good, absolutely needed to implant memories of the holocaust into each of our memories.… or you could simply define god as an evil being. so I would say that “logical impossibility” is a bit strong.
Given this premise, I now agree that I misunderstood >‘the term “logical impossibility”.’
Though, I unfortunately don’t understand what it does mean. I’ll look it up now and see if that further clarifies.
So from the Wikipedia page, I now understand stand it as something whereby the components of the logical equation in some way denote that the other components are incompatible with it, perhaps they denote some character of the other components at a level of analysis beyond one particular level of characterisation or grouping.
However, if it also comes down to what a particular person can conceive as possibility, doesn’t that come down to a particular person’s ability to visualise, imagine or recombine concepts into a coherent whole—which almost certainly various between those more cognitively flexible and those who aren’t?
In the Wikipedia example, understand why the sky is blue, not just at the physical level but psychological level of description, helps me imagine why someone might claim something apparently absurd like “the sky isn’t a sky”.
btw,w hen I googled for logical impossibility to get the Wikipage it suggested this stack exchange question
I think I see the problem. Whenever any philosopher says that something is logically impossible, they are specifically and openly aware that this is only conditionally true. For example, a square circle is only clearly a logical impossibility if the words square and circle mean the same thing every time I think them, including in the time period that I move from ‘square’ to ‘circle’; if the ideas of ‘square’ and ‘circle’ actually do have a referent, and I am not just deluded into feeling a clear sense of meaning when I think those words, (and including all defining terms [such as ‘right angle’]); if I am correct in believing that two non-identical things are necessarily not one thing; if I am correct in believing language can refer to things other than semantic relationships; and many other fun things, including the big one: the assumption that I exist and am thinking.
However, once you have gotten everyone on the same page, and we all admit that we cannot prove that we exist, we start talking about highly conditional realities, such as those in which BattleGround God is more than a deluded memory, in which the words on the LessWrong are entered by other people, realities in which computers and circles and ‘good’ actually exist in some meaningful sense…
...and we don’t all have the same set of conditionally accepted realities. Nor do we need to in order to make most arguments intelligible to both parties. As a matter of course, most of the things we talk about are propositioned on the existence of the external world as reported by our senses and the media. If we deviate from this, we specify this in some way.
And that explains logical impossibility… but then I realized that I hadn’t read your original question carefully enough.
BG has conflated “belief that God is a logical impossibility” and “you know that She doesn’t exist.” The second claim should be “you believe that She doesn’t exist.” BG tried too hard, and it fails. Next time, use a Real Philosopher(TM).