In David Rodin’s Posthuman Life, a book that is otherwise very obtuse and obscurely metaphysical, there is an interesting argument for making posthumans before we know what they might be (indeed, he rejected the precautionary principle on the making of posthumans):
CLAIM. We have an obligation to make posthumans, or not prevent their appearance.
PROOF.
Principle of accounting: we have an obligation to understand posthumans
Speculative posthumanism: there could be radical posthumans
Radical posthumans are impossible to understand unless we actually meet them
We can only meet radical posthumans if we make them (intentionally or accidentally).
This creates an ethical paradox, the posthuman impasse.
we are unable to evaluate any posthuman condition. Since posthumans could result from some iteration of our current technical activity, we have an interest in understanding what they might be like. If so, we have an interest in making or becoming posthumans.
to plan for the future evolution of humans, we should evaluate what posthumans are like, which kinds are good, which kinds are bad, before we make them.
most kinds of posthumans can only be evaluated after they appear.
completely giving up on making posthumans would lock humanity at the current level, which means we give up on great goods for fear of great bads. This is objectionable by arguments similar to those employed by transhumanists.
In David Rodin’s Posthuman Life, a book that is otherwise very obtuse and obscurely metaphysical, there is an interesting argument for making posthumans before we know what they might be (indeed, he rejected the precautionary principle on the making of posthumans):
CLAIM. We have an obligation to make posthumans, or not prevent their appearance.
PROOF.
Principle of accounting: we have an obligation to understand posthumans
Speculative posthumanism: there could be radical posthumans
Radical posthumans are impossible to understand unless we actually meet them
We can only meet radical posthumans if we make them (intentionally or accidentally).
This creates an ethical paradox, the posthuman impasse.
to plan for the future evolution of humans, we should evaluate what posthumans are like, which kinds are good, which kinds are bad, before we make them.
most kinds of posthumans can only be evaluated after they appear.
completely giving up on making posthumans would lock humanity at the current level, which means we give up on great goods for fear of great bads. This is objectionable by arguments similar to those employed by transhumanists.