There is still the murky area of following some proxy utility function within a sensible goodhart scope (a thing like base distribution of quantilization), even if you are not doing expected utility maximization and won’t be letting the siren song of the proxy lead you out of scope of the proxy. It just won’t be the utility function that selection theorems assign to you based on your coherent decisions, because you won’t be making coherent decisions according to the classical definitions if you are not doing expected utility maximization (which is unbounded optimization).
But then if you are not doing expected utility maximization, it’s not clear that things in the shape of utility functions are that useful in specifying decision problems. So a good proxy for an unknown utility function is not obviously itself a utility function.
There is still the murky area of following some proxy utility function within a sensible goodhart scope (a thing like base distribution of quantilization), even if you are not doing expected utility maximization and won’t be letting the siren song of the proxy lead you out of scope of the proxy. It just won’t be the utility function that selection theorems assign to you based on your coherent decisions, because you won’t be making coherent decisions according to the classical definitions if you are not doing expected utility maximization (which is unbounded optimization).
But then if you are not doing expected utility maximization, it’s not clear that things in the shape of utility functions are that useful in specifying decision problems. So a good proxy for an unknown utility function is not obviously itself a utility function.