An explicit belief that you would not allow yourself to hold under these conditions would be that the tree which falls in the forest makes a sound—because no one heard it, and because we can’t sense it afterwards, whether it made sound or not had no empirical consequence.
Every time I have seen this philosophical question posed on lesswrong, the two sophists that were arguing about it were in agreement that a sound would be produced (under the physical definition of the word), so I’d be really surprised if you could let go of that belief.
Hm, yeah. The trouble is how the doctrine handles deductive logic—for example, the belief that a falling tree makes vibrations in the air when the laws of physics say so is really a direct consequence of part of physics. The correct answer definitely appears to be that you can apply logic, and so the doctrine should be not to believe in something when there is no Bayesian evidence that differentiates it from some alternative.
An explicit belief that you would not allow yourself to hold under these conditions would be that the tree which falls in the forest makes a sound—because no one heard it, and because we can’t sense it afterwards, whether it made sound or not had no empirical consequence.
Every time I have seen this philosophical question posed on lesswrong, the two sophists that were arguing about it were in agreement that a sound would be produced (under the physical definition of the word), so I’d be really surprised if you could let go of that belief.
Hm, yeah. The trouble is how the doctrine handles deductive logic—for example, the belief that a falling tree makes vibrations in the air when the laws of physics say so is really a direct consequence of part of physics. The correct answer definitely appears to be that you can apply logic, and so the doctrine should be not to believe in something when there is no Bayesian evidence that differentiates it from some alternative.