GeniusNZ, you have to consider not only all proposed gods, but all possible gods and reward/punishment structures. Since the number and range of conceivable divine rewards and punishments is infinite for each action, the incentives are all equally balanced, and thus give you no reason to prefer one action over another.
Ultimately, I think Tom McCabe is right—the truth of a proposition depends in part on its meaningfulness.
What is the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow? Nearly 1, if you’re thinking of dawns. Nearly 0, if you’re thinking of Copernicus. Bayesian reasoning can evaluate propositions, but at the limit, one must already have a rational vocabulary in which to express hypotheses.
When someone threatens to kill 3^^^^3 people, this calls into question
1) whether the assertion is meaningful at all
2) whether the lives in question are equivalent to “human lives” already observed, or are unlike in kind—in other words, whether they should be valued similarly.
After all, analogously to the original Wager’s problem, these 3^^^^3 people could be of a negative moral value—it could be good to kill them. And no, Pascal’s Mugger cannot just respond that he means people like you and me, because they are obviously not exactly analogous, since they are unobservable.
GeniusNZ, you have to consider not only all proposed gods, but all possible gods and reward/punishment structures. Since the number and range of conceivable divine rewards and punishments is infinite for each action, the incentives are all equally balanced, and thus give you no reason to prefer one action over another.
Ultimately, I think Tom McCabe is right—the truth of a proposition depends in part on its meaningfulness.
What is the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow? Nearly 1, if you’re thinking of dawns. Nearly 0, if you’re thinking of Copernicus. Bayesian reasoning can evaluate propositions, but at the limit, one must already have a rational vocabulary in which to express hypotheses.
When someone threatens to kill 3^^^^3 people, this calls into question
1) whether the assertion is meaningful at all 2) whether the lives in question are equivalent to “human lives” already observed, or are unlike in kind—in other words, whether they should be valued similarly.
After all, analogously to the original Wager’s problem, these 3^^^^3 people could be of a negative moral value—it could be good to kill them. And no, Pascal’s Mugger cannot just respond that he means people like you and me, because they are obviously not exactly analogous, since they are unobservable.