The SA so far stands to show that the central belief of broad theism is basically correct.
“The universe was created by an intelligence” is the central belief of deism, not theism. Whether or not the intelligence would interact with the universe, for what reasons, and to what ends, are open questions.
Also, at this point I’m more inclined to accept Tegmark’s mathematical universe description than the simulation argument.
wrong versions of a right idea
That seems oxymoronic to me.
There are superficial similarities between the simulation argument and theism, but, for example, the idea of worship/deference in the latter is a major element that the former lacks. The important question is: will using theistic terminology help with clarity and understanding for the simulation argument? The answer does not appear to be yes.
The SA so far stands to show that the central belief of broad theism is basically correct.
“The universe was created by an intelligence” is the central belief of deism, not theism. Whether or not the intelligence would interact with the universe, for what reasons, and to what ends, are open questions.
You’re right, I completely agree with the above in terms of the theism/deism distinction. The SA supports deism while allowing for theism but leaving it as an open question. My term “broad theism” meant to include theism & deism. Perhaps that category already has a term, not quite sure.
Also, at this point I’m more inclined to accept Tegmark’s mathematical universe description than the simulation argument.
I find the SA has much stronger support—Tegmark requires the additional belief that other physical universes exist for which we can never possibly find evidence for against.
There are superficial similarities between the simulation argument and theism, but, for example, the idea of worship/deference in the latter is a major element that the former lacks.
Some fraction of simulations probably have creators who desire some form of worship/deference, the SA turns this into a question of frequency or probability. I of course expect that worship-desiring creators are highly unlikely. Regardless, worship is not a defining characteristic of theism.
The important question is: will using theistic terminology help with clarity and understanding for the simulation argument?
I see it as the other way around. The SA gives us a reasonable structure within which to (re)-evaluate theism.
I find the SA has much stronger support—Tegmark requires the additional belief that other physical universes exist for which we can never possibly find evidence for against.
How could we find evidence of the universe simulating our own, if we are in a simulation? They’re both logical arguments, not empirical ones.
Regardless, worship is not a defining characteristic of theism.
The SA gives us a reasonable structure within which to (re)-evaluate theism.
I really don’t see what is so desirable about theism that we ought to define it to line up near-perfectly with the simulation argument in order to use it and related terminology. Any rhetorical scaffolding for dealing with Creators that theists have built up over the centuries is dripping with the negative connotations I referenced earlier. What net advantage do we gain by using it?
How could we find evidence of the universe simulating our own, if we are in a simulation? They’re both logical arguments, not empirical ones.
If say in 2080 we have created a number of high-fidelity historical recreations of 2010 with billions of sentient virtual humans who which is nearly indistinguishable (from their perspective) to our original 2010, then much of the uncertainty in the argument is eliminated.
(some uncertainty always remains, of course)
The other distinct possibility is that our simulation reaches some endpoint and possible re-integration, at which point it would be obvious.
“The universe was created by an intelligence” is the central belief of deism, not theism. Whether or not the intelligence would interact with the universe, for what reasons, and to what ends, are open questions.
Also, at this point I’m more inclined to accept Tegmark’s mathematical universe description than the simulation argument.
That seems oxymoronic to me.
There are superficial similarities between the simulation argument and theism, but, for example, the idea of worship/deference in the latter is a major element that the former lacks. The important question is: will using theistic terminology help with clarity and understanding for the simulation argument? The answer does not appear to be yes.
You’re right, I completely agree with the above in terms of the theism/deism distinction. The SA supports deism while allowing for theism but leaving it as an open question. My term “broad theism” meant to include theism & deism. Perhaps that category already has a term, not quite sure.
I find the SA has much stronger support—Tegmark requires the additional belief that other physical universes exist for which we can never possibly find evidence for against.
Some fraction of simulations probably have creators who desire some form of worship/deference, the SA turns this into a question of frequency or probability. I of course expect that worship-desiring creators are highly unlikely. Regardless, worship is not a defining characteristic of theism.
I see it as the other way around. The SA gives us a reasonable structure within which to (re)-evaluate theism.
How could we find evidence of the universe simulating our own, if we are in a simulation? They’re both logical arguments, not empirical ones.
I really don’t see what is so desirable about theism that we ought to define it to line up near-perfectly with the simulation argument in order to use it and related terminology. Any rhetorical scaffolding for dealing with Creators that theists have built up over the centuries is dripping with the negative connotations I referenced earlier. What net advantage do we gain by using it?
If say in 2080 we have created a number of high-fidelity historical recreations of 2010 with billions of sentient virtual humans who which is nearly indistinguishable (from their perspective) to our original 2010, then much of the uncertainty in the argument is eliminated.
(some uncertainty always remains, of course)
The other distinct possibility is that our simulation reaches some endpoint and possible re-integration, at which point it would be obvious.