Sam Harris is misguided at best in the major conclusions he draws about objective morality. See this blog post by Sean Carroll, which links to his previous posts on the subject.
Have you read Less Wrong’s metaethics sequence? It and The Moral Landscape reach pretty much the same conclusions, except about the true nature of terminal values, which is a major conclusion, but only one among many.
Sean Carroll, on the other hand, gets absolutely everything wrong.
Given that the full title of the book is “The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values,” I think that conclusion is the major one, and certainly the controversial one. “Science can help us judge things that involve facts” and similar ideas aren’t really news to anyone who understands science. Values aren’t a certain kind of fact.
I don’t see where Sean’s conclusions are functionally different from those in the metaethics sequence. They’re presented in a much less philosophically rigorous form, because Sean is a physicist, not a philosopher (and so am I). For example, this statement of Sean’s:
But there’s no reason why we can’t be judgmental and firm in our personal convictions, even if we are honest that those convictions don’t have the same status as objective laws of nature.
Given that the full title of the book is “The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values,” I think that conclusion is the major one, and certainly the controversial one. “Science can help us judge things that involve facts” and similar ideas aren’t really news to anyone who understands science. Values aren’t a certain kind of fact.
To be accurate Harris should have inserted the word “Instrumental” before “Values” in his book’s title, and left out the paragraphs where he argues that the well-being of conscious minds is the basis of morality for reasons other than that the well-being of conscious minds is the basis of morality. There would still be at least two thirds of the book left, and there would still be a huge amount of people who would find it controversial, and I’m not just talking about religious fundamentalists.
I don’t see where Sean’s conclusions are functionally different from those in the metaethics sequence. They’re presented in a much less philosophically rigorous form, because Sean is a physicist, not a philosopher (and so am I). For example, this statement of Sean’s:
[...]
and this one of Eliezer’s:
[...]
seem to express the same sentiment, to me.
The difference is huge. Eliezer and I do believe that our ‘convictions’ have the same status as objective laws of nature (although we assign lower probability to some of them, obviously).
There would still be at least two thirds of the book left, and there would still be a huge amount of people who would find it controversial, and I’m not just talking about religious fundamentalists.
I wouldn’t limit “people who don’t understand science” to “religious fundamentalists,” so I don’t think we really disagree. A huge amount of people find evolution to be controversial, too, but I wouldn’t give much credence to that “controversy” in a serious discussion.
The difference is huge. Eliezer (and I) do believe that our ‘convictions’ have the same status as objective laws of nature (although we assign lower probability to some of them, obviously).
The quantum numbers which an electron possesses are the same whether you’re a human or a Pebblesorter. There’s an objectively right answer, and therefore objectively wrong answers. Convictions/terminal values cannot be compared in that way.
If you identify rightness with this huge computational property, then moral judgments are subjunctively objective (like math), subjectively objective (like probability), and capable of being true (like counterfactuals).
but he later says
Finally I realized that there was no foundation but humanity—no evidence pointing to even a reasonable doubt that there was anything else—and indeed I shouldn’t even want to hope for anything else—and indeed would have no moral cause to follow the dictates of a light in the sky, even if I found one.
That’s what the difference is, to me. An electron would have its quantum numbers whether or not humanity existed to discover them. 2 + 2 = 4 is true whether or not humanity is around to think it. Terminal values are higher level, less fundamental in terms of nature, because humanity (or other intelligent life) has to exist in order for them to exist. We can find what’s morally right based on terminal values, but we can’t find terminal values that are objectively right in that they exist whether or not we do.
Careful. The quantum numbers are no more than a basis for describing an electron. I can describe a stick as spanning a distance 3 meters wide and 4 long, while a pebblesorter describes it as being 5 meters long and 0 wide, and we can both be right. The same thing can happen when describing a quantum object.
I wouldn’t limit “people who don’t understand science” to “religious fundamentalists,” so I don’t think we really disagree. A huge amount of people find evolution to be controversial, too, but I wouldn’t give much credence to that “controversy” in a serious discussion.
Okay, let me make my claim stronger then: A huge amount of people who understand science would find the truncated version of TML described above controversial: A big fraction of the people who usually call themselves moral nihilists or moral relativists.
The quantum numbers which define an electron are the same whether you’re a human or a Pebblesorter. There’s an objectively right answer, and therefore objectively wrong answers. Convictions/terminal values cannot be compared in that way.
I’m saying that there is an objectively right answer, that terminal values can be compared (in a way that is tautological in this case, but that is fundamentally the only way we can determine the truth of anything). See this comment.
Do you believe it is true that “For every natural number x, x = x”? Yes? Why do you believe that? Well, you believe it because for every natural number x, x = x. How do you compare this axiom to “For every natural number x, x != x”?
Anyway, at least one of us is misunderstanding the metaethics sequence, so this exchange is rather pointless unless we want to get into a really complex conversation about a sequence of posts that has to total at least 100,000 words, and I don’t want to. Sorry.
That terminal values are like axioms, not like theorems. That is, they’re the things without which you cannot actually ask the question, “Is this true?”
You can say or write the words “Is”, “this”, and “true” without having axioms related to that question somewhere in your mind, of course, but you can’t mean anything coherent by the sentence. Someone who asks, “Why terminal value A rather than terminal value B?” and expects (or gives) an answer other than “Because of terminal value A, obviously!”* is confused.
*That’s assuming that A really is a terminal value of the person’s moral system. It could be an instrumental value; people have been known to hold false beliefs about their own minds.
Have you read Less Wrong’s metaethics sequence? It and The Moral Landscape reach pretty much the same conclusions, except about the true nature of terminal values, which is a major conclusion, but only one among many.
Sean Carroll, on the other hand, gets absolutely everything wrong.
Given that the full title of the book is “The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values,” I think that conclusion is the major one, and certainly the controversial one. “Science can help us judge things that involve facts” and similar ideas aren’t really news to anyone who understands science. Values aren’t a certain kind of fact.
I don’t see where Sean’s conclusions are functionally different from those in the metaethics sequence. They’re presented in a much less philosophically rigorous form, because Sean is a physicist, not a philosopher (and so am I). For example, this statement of Sean’s:
and this one of Eliezer’s:
seem to express the same sentiment, to me.
If you really object to Sean’s writing, take a look at Russell Blackford’s review of the book. (He is a philosopher, and a transhumanist one at that.)
To be accurate Harris should have inserted the word “Instrumental” before “Values” in his book’s title, and left out the paragraphs where he argues that the well-being of conscious minds is the basis of morality for reasons other than that the well-being of conscious minds is the basis of morality. There would still be at least two thirds of the book left, and there would still be a huge amount of people who would find it controversial, and I’m not just talking about religious fundamentalists.
The difference is huge. Eliezer and I do believe that our ‘convictions’ have the same status as objective laws of nature (although we assign lower probability to some of them, obviously).
I wouldn’t limit “people who don’t understand science” to “religious fundamentalists,” so I don’t think we really disagree. A huge amount of people find evolution to be controversial, too, but I wouldn’t give much credence to that “controversy” in a serious discussion.
The quantum numbers which an electron possesses are the same whether you’re a human or a Pebblesorter. There’s an objectively right answer, and therefore objectively wrong answers. Convictions/terminal values cannot be compared in that way.
I understand what Eliezer means when he says:
but he later says
That’s what the difference is, to me. An electron would have its quantum numbers whether or not humanity existed to discover them. 2 + 2 = 4 is true whether or not humanity is around to think it. Terminal values are higher level, less fundamental in terms of nature, because humanity (or other intelligent life) has to exist in order for them to exist. We can find what’s morally right based on terminal values, but we can’t find terminal values that are objectively right in that they exist whether or not we do.
Careful. The quantum numbers are no more than a basis for describing an electron. I can describe a stick as spanning a distance 3 meters wide and 4 long, while a pebblesorter describes it as being 5 meters long and 0 wide, and we can both be right. The same thing can happen when describing a quantum object.
Yes, I should have been more careful with my language. Thanks for pointing it out. Edited.
Okay, let me make my claim stronger then: A huge amount of people who understand science would find the truncated version of TML described above controversial: A big fraction of the people who usually call themselves moral nihilists or moral relativists.
I’m saying that there is an objectively right answer, that terminal values can be compared (in a way that is tautological in this case, but that is fundamentally the only way we can determine the truth of anything). See this comment.
Do you believe it is true that “For every natural number x, x = x”? Yes? Why do you believe that? Well, you believe it because for every natural number x, x = x. How do you compare this axiom to “For every natural number x, x != x”?
Anyway, at least one of us is misunderstanding the metaethics sequence, so this exchange is rather pointless unless we want to get into a really complex conversation about a sequence of posts that has to total at least 100,000 words, and I don’t want to. Sorry.
In quick approximation, what was this conclusion?
That terminal values are like axioms, not like theorems. That is, they’re the things without which you cannot actually ask the question, “Is this true?”
You can say or write the words “Is”, “this”, and “true” without having axioms related to that question somewhere in your mind, of course, but you can’t mean anything coherent by the sentence. Someone who asks, “Why terminal value A rather than terminal value B?” and expects (or gives) an answer other than “Because of terminal value A, obviously!”* is confused.
*That’s assuming that A really is a terminal value of the person’s moral system. It could be an instrumental value; people have been known to hold false beliefs about their own minds.