You say you’re a fallibist, but you’re actually falling into the failure mode described in this article. Suppose you’ve got a question with positions A and B, with a a bunch of supporting arguments for A, and a bunch of supporting arguments for B. Some of those arguments for each side will be wrong, or ambiguous, or inapplicable—that’s what fallibilism predicts and I think we all agree with that.
Suppose there are 3 valid and 3 invalid arguments for A, and 3 valid and 3 invalid arguments for B. Now suppose someone decides to get rid any of the arguments that are invalid, but they happen to think A is better. Most people will end up attacking all the arguments for B, but they won’t look as closely at the arguments for A. After they’re finished, they’ll have 3 valid and 3 invalid arguments for A, and 3 valid arguments for B—which looks like a preponderance of evidence in favor of B, but it isn’t.
Now read the abstract of that paper you linked again. That paper disagrees with where K&T draw the boundary between questions that trigger the conjunction fallacy and questions that don’t, and describe the underlying mechanism that produces it differently. They do not claim that the conjunction fallacy doesn’t exist.
You say you’re a fallibist, but you’re actually falling into the failure mode described in this article. Suppose you’ve got a question with positions A and B, with a a bunch of supporting arguments for A, and a bunch of supporting arguments for B. Some of those arguments for each side will be wrong, or ambiguous, or inapplicable—that’s what fallibilism predicts and I think we all agree with that.
Suppose there are 3 valid and 3 invalid arguments for A, and 3 valid and 3 invalid arguments for B. Now suppose someone decides to get rid any of the arguments that are invalid, but they happen to think A is better. Most people will end up attacking all the arguments for B, but they won’t look as closely at the arguments for A. After they’re finished, they’ll have 3 valid and 3 invalid arguments for A, and 3 valid arguments for B—which looks like a preponderance of evidence in favor of B, but it isn’t.
Now read the abstract of that paper you linked again. That paper disagrees with where K&T draw the boundary between questions that trigger the conjunction fallacy and questions that don’t, and describe the underlying mechanism that produces it differently. They do not claim that the conjunction fallacy doesn’t exist.