Do you understand DD’s point that the majority of the time theories are rejected without testing which is in both his books? Testing is only useful when dealing with good explanations.
Do you understand that data alone cannot choose between the infinitely many theories consistent with it, which reach a wide variety of contradictory and opposite conclusions? So Bayesian Updating based on data does not solve the problem of choosing between theories. What does?
Do you understand DD’s point that the majority of the time theories are rejected without testing which is in both his books? Testing is only useful when dealing with good explanations.
Bayesians are also seriously concerned with the fact that an infinity of theories are consistent with the evidence. DD evidently doesn’t think so, given his comments on Occam’s Razor, which he appears to be familiar with only in an old, crude version, but I think that there is a lot in common between his “good explanation” criterion and parsimony considerations.
We aren’t “seriously concerned” because we have solved the problem, and it’s not particularly relevant to our approach.
We just bring it up as a criticism of epistemologies that fail to solve the problem… Because they have failed, they should be rejected.
You haven’t provided details about your fixed Occam’s razor, a specific criticism of any specific thing DD said, a solution to the problem of induction (all epistemologies need one of some sort), or a solution to the infinity of theories problem.
Where do you get the theories you consider?
Do you understand DD’s point that the majority of the time theories are rejected without testing which is in both his books? Testing is only useful when dealing with good explanations.
Do you understand that data alone cannot choose between the infinitely many theories consistent with it, which reach a wide variety of contradictory and opposite conclusions? So Bayesian Updating based on data does not solve the problem of choosing between theories. What does?
Bayesians are also seriously concerned with the fact that an infinity of theories are consistent with the evidence. DD evidently doesn’t think so, given his comments on Occam’s Razor, which he appears to be familiar with only in an old, crude version, but I think that there is a lot in common between his “good explanation” criterion and parsimony considerations.
We aren’t “seriously concerned” because we have solved the problem, and it’s not particularly relevant to our approach.
We just bring it up as a criticism of epistemologies that fail to solve the problem… Because they have failed, they should be rejected.
You haven’t provided details about your fixed Occam’s razor, a specific criticism of any specific thing DD said, a solution to the problem of induction (all epistemologies need one of some sort), or a solution to the infinity of theories problem.