I haven’t found anything Eliezer’s written about Einstein to not be useful. Could you explain why you don’t like it (and/or specify what it is you dislike), or link me to an explanation?
If we want to shorten the QM stuff and explain MWI without belaboring its truth, I don’t think it would be out of the question to commission a specialist like Amit Hagar or David Albert to write a short explanation of what the QM-interpretation fuss is all about, insert that right before the more important QM implications philosophy-of-science stuff (Think like reality, When science can’t help, etc.), and then put Eliezer’s technical explanations in an appendix. That would do a lot to mitigate the criticism of the Sequences for uncredentialed nonstandard physics espousal, and it would lose fewer readers whose math or physics backgrounds are weak.
I haven’t found anything Eliezer’s written about Einstein to not be useful. Could you explain why you don’t like it (and/or specify what it is you dislike), or link me to an explanation?
What has been proven wrong is the idea that explicit Bayesian thinking gives a physicist a significant rather than a marginal advantage. I don’t know of any physicist who learned Bayesian thinking and suddenly became much more productive/successful/famous. You are likely to do better than without it, but you will never be as good as a noticeably smarter not-explicitly-Bayesian physicist, let alone Einstein.
Eliezer’s waxing poetic about Barbour, who is a fringe scientist with intriguing ideas but without many notable achievements, is high on pathos, but not very convincing.
I haven’t found anything Eliezer’s written about Einstein to not be useful. Could you explain why you don’t like it (and/or specify what it is you dislike), or link me to an explanation?
If we want to shorten the QM stuff and explain MWI without belaboring its truth, I don’t think it would be out of the question to commission a specialist like Amit Hagar or David Albert to write a short explanation of what the QM-interpretation fuss is all about, insert that right before the more important QM implications philosophy-of-science stuff (Think like reality, When science can’t help, etc.), and then put Eliezer’s technical explanations in an appendix. That would do a lot to mitigate the criticism of the Sequences for uncredentialed nonstandard physics espousal, and it would lose fewer readers whose math or physics backgrounds are weak.
What has been proven wrong is the idea that explicit Bayesian thinking gives a physicist a significant rather than a marginal advantage. I don’t know of any physicist who learned Bayesian thinking and suddenly became much more productive/successful/famous. You are likely to do better than without it, but you will never be as good as a noticeably smarter not-explicitly-Bayesian physicist, let alone Einstein.
Eliezer’s waxing poetic about Barbour, who is a fringe scientist with intriguing ideas but without many notable achievements, is high on pathos, but not very convincing.