Telling people to “beware, you might be biased” is not useless, but is almost so—all you can do is become more uncertain. Telling people “beware your judgment when drunk” is a lot more useful, as you can then become more uncertain when drunk, and more certain when not drunk.
Telling people to in general “beware of assuming aliens are like you” is very weak advice. It would be much more helpful to tell them more specifically kinds of situations or features for which they are more likely to make this error.
Economists usually get the opposite complaint, that our math models are too much about a generic social intelligence, and too little about specific features of human society.
Telling people to “beware, you might be biased” is not useless, but is almost so—all you can do is become more uncertain. Telling people “beware your judgment when drunk” is a lot more useful, as you can then become more uncertain when drunk, and more certain when not drunk.
Telling people to in general “beware of assuming aliens are like you” is very weak advice. It would be much more helpful to tell them more specifically kinds of situations or features for which they are more likely to make this error.
Economists usually get the opposite complaint, that our math models are too much about a generic social intelligence, and too little about specific features of human society.